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INTRODUCTION 
Gen Colin Powell: 
"We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to 
plan for ... " 
Reporter: 
"And will this make it more or less likely for US 
forces to go into battle?" 
Powell: 
"Haven't the 
whole point. 
foggiest. I don't know. That's the 
We don't know like we used to know."(l) 
... it is of exceptional importance in considering how 
the ... community might be more involved in measures for 
its own defence, and for other reasons too, that broad 
judgements of threat credibility and warning time ... be 
accepted as part of the foundation on which national 
consensus on our defence posture should be built.(2) 
Colin Powell is surely right: the Uni ted States doesn't 
know like it used to know. The end of East - West 
ideological confrontation has called into question the 
rationale for NATO, for US conventional strategy and the 
basis 
role, 
of 
and 
nuclear deterrence. The 
the future development 
present 
of the 
structure and 
Uni ted St ates' 
military capacity is being fundamentally questioned. 
For New Zealand defence planners, the dilemma of 'not 
knowing' is not new. The New Zea land Government's whi te 
r 
t 
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paper on defence, Defence of New Zealand 1991 (DONZ91), 
reflecting 
threats to 
a long held view, sta tes "there are no direct 
our security". The difference in scale between 
New Zealand's defence capability and that of the United 
States could not be more stark. But that only serves to 
emphasise the point of the comparlson: the dilemma of 'not 
knowing' raises for both countries, as it does for many 
others, important issues about the purpose and nature of 
military forces. Questions of where, when and against whom 
most crucial determinants of military are among the 
planning, and yet, what little reliable guidance could be 
drawn during the Cold War, has been removed. For all sorts 
of reasons, military as well as political and financial, 
those who work within the sphere of defence planning are 
now being asked to justify themselves afresh. They must, 
work to bui Id consensus as a 
This paper is part of that 
as Wrigley exhorts above, 
basis for defence posture. 
effort. 
There are many aspects of defence planning which could be 
taken up in this vein. The present study concentrates on 
one: the notion of strategic warning time and its possible 
application to New Zealand. But why warning time? After 
all, the British fared badly under a similar concept, known 
as the Ten Year Rule. That piece of policy guidance , 
established in 1919, stated that 
It shall be assumed for framing revised Estimates that 
the British Empire will not be engaged in any great 
war during the next ten years, and that no 
Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose.( 3) 
The conceptualisation and application of the Ten Year Rule 
left Britain ill-prepared when war did come. That 
experience also seriously questioned the notion that states 
could gauge their present defence efforts against some idea 
I:' 
I: 
'I 
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of what the future might 
sudden events, that the 
3 
hold; it suggested, 
best protection lies 
as 
1n 
do all 
having 
forces ready now, rather than in having forces on paper. 
But this study is not about to propose the use of a Ten 
Year Rule for New Zealand. Indeed, as is discussed in 
later chapters, there are sound reasons why that concept 1S 
of dubious value for New Zealand. But there is a good case 
to be made for applying tools with which to plan our future 
requirements. Strategic warning time is such a tool. 
Strategic warning time 
the defence planning of 
currently plays a pivotal role . 1n 
some states, from which experience 
Two settings in particular New Zealand can learn. 
Australia and the United 
Chapter One of this paper. 
it is (or was) applied 1S 
States/NATO are examined in 
The notion of warning time as 
described and critiqued. The 
question asked of these case examples is typically 'Kiwi': 
how have others fared and can their experiences be usefully 
adapted for New Zealand conditions? 
The concept of strategic warning time is little understood 
1n New Zealand defence planning circles and even less 
applied. In response to this, Chapter Two looks at warning 
time in an abstract sense, explaining what it is and why it 
is important as a planning concept. 
In Chapters Three and Four the question of 'wha t value is 
strategic warning time to New Zealand?' is exami ned. 
Chapter Three will provide an overview of New Zealand's 
past experience with notions of warning, including, 1n 
Annex A, an analysis of warning received for past 
deployments. Chapter Four then presents a framework of a 
warning time model. It will be seen that the value of 
L4 , 
II 
I· 
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warn1ng t i me to New Zealand is mixed and not uniform ac ross 
all of the tasks pe r formed by the New Zealand Defence Fo rce 
(NZDF). Neve r theless, there i s a strong case to be ma de 
for the const r uction of a robus t and sophisticated warn1ng 
time model fo r New Zealand's unique strategic circumstances. 
An important caveat to this work i s that it does not seek 
to predict threats to New Zealand . Nor is this a study o f 
force expansion and lead times. Th is paper focuses on t he 
methodology of defence planning, ske tching a framework for 
a model of warning time and suggest ing avenues for furt her 
research. In this context, Sir Mi chael Quinlan h as 
observed that 
... the name of the game is c hoice, where uncertainty 
is pervasive and we cannot af ford the full menu; a nd 
with choice, inevitably, go r isk and opportunity cos t 
- choice, that is, what not t o provide, where to take 
a chance or accept dependence. In most of these 
assorted dimensions, of course, the planner is in the 
business of balance and blend, rather than 
black-and-white or absolute ei ther-or.(4) 
It 1S the interacting problems of extended time-scale and 
uncertainty which present the la rgest problems for the 
defence planne r . The value of s trategic warning time 1S 
that it can help to bring g r e ater certainty ove r an 
extended time-frame; to make choices and to minimise risk. 
In offering these arguments, t h is study presents itself 
from a parochial New Zealand perspective. But the focus 
and recommendations of this pape r are fully intended t o be 
New Zealand-centric. In wri ting this p aper the author 
became acutely aware of the dea rth of publicly available 
information on strategic and de f ence planning issues in New 
Zealand, which, aside from s e v e rely limiting the 
availability of source mate r ial, also provided some 
J j' ~ 
I." 
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motivation to contribute to a wider and better informed 
debate. 
Footnotes 
1 Guardian Weekly, 9 June 1991. 
2 Alan Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community 
(1990). 
3 
4 
Quoted in W David McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for 
War (1988), p 67. 
Sir Michael Quinlan, 
Changing World", The 
1992, p 162. 
"British Defence Planning in a 
World Today, August/September 
r 
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Chapter One 
THE APPLICATION OF WARNING TIME: 
NATO/UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the 
placed in its broad 
evolution of strategic warning 1S 
historical context. Technologica l 
developments in particular have led to great advances 1n 
the ability of states to wage war at short notice and, as a 
corollary to this, have also meant that larger demands a r e 
now made on states to be forewarned of strategi c 
developments. 
The application of strategic warning is examined 1n more 
detail in two modern settings: firstly, the United st ates, 
with particular emphasis on conventional NATO commitments 
and recent changes in US strategic posture. It was on 
NATO's Central Front during the Cold War that the u se of 
warning time was most highly developed, and NATO st rategy 
relied heavily on the concept throughout Eas t/West 
confrontation. Of particular relevance to New Zea land's 
circumstance is the changing nature of current us 
thinking. Since the removal of an overarching threa t a nd 
without the geographical focus provided by Europe. The 
~. 
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united 
threat 
States . 1S 
environment 
adjusting its notion of warning to a 
which, although better overall, 1S now 
far more confused. 
The second example focuses on Australia, where the absence 
of a defined threat has been the most basic obstacle to the 
of a strategy for the defence of the development 
continent. In spite of this, such a strategy has been 
developed since the 1970s, and the notion of warning time 
has been central to it. Paul Dibb has commented that "The 
methodology that has been developed in this threat -free 
context could have 
powers".(l) This, 
strategic environment 
applications 
plus a large 
of Australia 
to other medium-sized 
overlap between the 
and New Zealand, makes 
the Australian setting of particula r 
Zealand. 
interest to New 
THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC WARNING 
In Clausewitz' s time, the slow pace of mobilisation and 
movement provided sufficient . warn1ng of an opponent's 
intention such that the possibility of surpr1se was a 
tactical rather than a strategic concern: 
Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply 
because in tactics, time and space are limited in 
scale. Therefore in strategy, surprise becomes more 
feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, 
and more difficult the more it approaches the higher 
levels of policy ... It is very rare therefore that one 
state surprises another, ei ther by an attack or by 
preparations for war.(2) 
A 'revolution in movement' during the nineteenth century 
however, made strategic surprise possible: in a purely 
military sense, the importance of strategic warning time 
WPPISACI 327 
8 
has evolved from a condensing o f time and space since the 
ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 1 815. By this we refer to 
the exploitation of dramatic technological advances In 
transport brought about by the development of railway 
networks in Europe and the New Wo rl d and, later, the 
invention of the interna I combustion engi ne. These events 
accelerated the pace of - and, more arguab ly, the potential 
for war, allowing a state to mobil ise, concentrate, 
attack and then sustain a force at g r ea ter speeds and on 
greater scales than ever before.(3) 
Accentuating the rapid movement of l arge numb e rs of troops 
were concurrent advances in weapo n r y , c ommunications, 
tactics and the administration of wa r. The introduction of 
airpower in the twentieth century add e d a f urther dimension 
to the equation, allowing the delive ry of firepowe r in any 
direction, and at extremely short no tice by forces already 
'in being'. Taken together, these deve lopments gav e to a 
state an unprecedented abi Ii ty to bo th surprise an enemy, 
and to inflict enormous losses. 
The passing of an era in which str ategic mobilis a tion was 
easily detectable gave way to a hei ghtened r e quirement for 
defenders to possess accurate and timely intell i gence of 
their neighbour's activities.(4) Ind e ed, it was during the 
Austro-Prussian War of 1866 that t h e timing of mobilisation 
first really mattered: rather tha n re acting to the onset 
of hostilities, it was the reciproca l fear of attack and 
considerations regarding the t ime needed to assemble 
operational forces which heavily influenced the beginning 
of war. Even more intensely analysed in t h is respect have 
been the events leading up to the July Cris i s of 1914. The 
conventional wisdom has it that " ... the war came about 
mainly because of railway timetables".( 5 ) The fear of 
WPPISACI 327 
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being left behind in the race to prepare for war had 
encouraged the development of a system of interlocking 
mobilisation plans in Europe with the German Schlieffen 
Plan at its centre.(6) 
In the nuclear age, the advent of the intercontinental 
ballistic missile (and precision guided munitions In 
general) epitomises the importance of strategic warnIng: 
any country can clandestinely mobilise its forces and gain 
tremendous advantage by attacking first. Wi th the advent 
of the US nuclear doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, 
the application of strategic warning became absolutely 
crucial: early warning became key to guaranteeing the 
integrity of the deterrent (especially the vulnerable 
land-based leg of the triad) since only then could an 
effective counter-strike be ensured. 
There is, of course, a fierce debate over whether new 
technologies have returned some or all of the advantage to 
the defence (with the advent of air defence systems, 
satellites and so forth). But, on balance, it remains the 
case that modern warfare has seen a dramatic Increase In 
the ability of a state to wage war at short notice, with 
little warning, over great distances, and with greater 
firepower. As a consequence, the warning time available to 
the defender has decreased by a similar quantum . 
Ironically, because of the potentially crippling effects of 
a surprIse attack wi th modern weaponry, warning time has 
decreased inversely to the need to receive it. 
II 
t: 
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THE UNITED STATES: WARNING TIME IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE 
"NEW WORLD ORDER" 
To establish defence readines s in time it is of 
critical importance that the ava ilable warning-time be 
utilized purposefully. 
1983 west German White Paper on Defence. 
In 1967 NATO replaced its strategy of massive nuclear 
retaliation with a posture of 'Flexible Response' designed 
to avoid war with the Soviet Un i on t h rough deterrence. An 
important element of the strategy wa s the principle of 
forward defence which aimed to defend the intra-German 
border, and to minimise damage and the loss of ground to an 
invading Warsaw Pact force. 
Forward Defence was based on the p remise that surprise and 
attack were two key features of Soviet strategy: since the 
pUblication in 1962 of Sokolovskii's seminal Soviet 
Military Strategy, NATO strategis ts had assumed that a 
Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on the Central Front 
would seek maximum advantage 
general consensus was that 
by mi nimising warning. The 
Warsaw Pact forces held a 
significant 
decide to 
conventional advantage 
initiate war on the 
should Moscow suddenly 
Central Front; by 
comparison, NATO forces were fewer in number, less ready, 
had greater distances to trave l (both within 
across the Atlantic), and su f fe red from a 
Europe and 
potentially 
crippling lack of command unity at the political level. 
NATO planners assessed that success o n the conventional 
battlefield was dependent upon the ir ability to hold out 
until reinforcements - particularly US troops - had arrived 
from the rear. 
il 
II-
( ~ 
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In the European theatre and for the purposes of Forward 
Defence, warning time became a central element of NATO 
planning. In conventional terms, it was commonly defined 
as "the time available between the evident understanding 
that the Warsaw Pact is preparing for an attack and the 
actual outbreak of hostilities." The definition reflects 
the fact that although warning time estimates did inform 
longer range planning, they were primari ly concerned wi th 
(and regarded as) a basis for determining immediate 
operational needs.(7) 
Based on these estimates, United States planning 
established its own 
mobilisation plans 
schedule of readiness requirements, 
and contingency arrangements to meet 
Given that warning time was expected to NATO commitments. 
be short, the US assigned personnel and materiel readiness 
its highest funding and strategic priority; pre-positioned 
materiel and airlift was emphasised as a means of 
minimising forward deployments. NATO planners were 
confident of some warning of an impending Warsaw Pact 
attack, but expected that indications might be ambiguous 
and acted on only after some delay . Consequent ly, during 
the 1980s, nearly six division-equivalents and 27 fighter 
squadrons were regularly stationed in Europe to guard 
against a Soviet surprise attack. In such an event, as 
many as ten more divisions and 42 more fighter squadrons 
would be moved on short notice from the US by means of 
pre-positioning and airlift.(8) 
It was essential for the success of forward defence In 
Europe then, that early warning be gained to allow 
defensive preparations to begin in the face of an impending 
attack. Commanders relied heavily on intelligence and 
assessments of hostility indicators that would give clear 
il 
11 
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and early warning of attack. 
Europe were highly debatable, 
Assessments of warnlng ln 
though the standard planning 
assumption appears to have been that the Pact would require 
about four days to mount an attack by its standing forces 
to achieve very limited goals, nine days following 
mobilisation to prepare an offensive with more ambitious 
territorial objectives, and two weeks for a campaign that 
threatened all of Western Europe.(9) For example, based on 
the (then existing) balance of forces, Kauffmann has 
calculated that, following two weeks of mobilisation, NATO 
had only a 15-20 percent chance of defending itself for 15 
days against a Warsaw Pact attack. (10) Such estimates did 
not sit well with US plans to allow ten days to get 
reinforcements from the US to Europe (where they would 
likely spend up to another five days becoming operationally 
ready).(II) 
Events in Europe over the last few years, however, have 
made the case for maintaining high levels of readiness 
across the board unnecessary: neithe r a bolt from the blue 
(nor even a bolt from the grey) is likely in the 
future. (12) The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the 
abandonment of Forward Defence in Europe have fundamentally 
changed the Uni ted States' strateg ic posture. The precise 
amount of additional warning time remains undetermined, 
though it has increased dramatic ally: the 1991 US Joint 
Military Net Assessment (JMNA) commented that the 
probability of major conventional conflict in Europe "is 
low, and warning time has so greatly increased, that these 
conflicts are no longer the central point of focus or the 
principal driver of requirements for forces."(13) 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the retreat of 
Soviet forward echelons means that any return by Russia to 
WPPISAC1 327 
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a threatening posture will stil l face newly independent 
Eastern European states as buffe rs between it and Western 
Europe . The restrictive terms of the Conventional Forces 
l n Europe (CFE) Treaty further complicates any offensive 
manoeuvre for both Russia and the Ukraine, while the 
economlC and political disarray fa cing the former Soviet 
republics provides distractions t o any adventurism. The 
Uni ted States estimates that even we re the 'Soviet Union' 
(read Russia) to re-emerge as a th reat, it would take them 
"several months to years" to retu rn fully to pre-CFE force 
levels.(14} 
Consequently, US Cold War plans for reinforcing the 
European theatre have given way to a slower and more 
traditional mobilisation and rein forcement strategy. The 
level of US forward presence fo r the defence of Europe is 
agaln under review, this time by the Clinton 
Administration, and may go as low as 40,000.(15) Moving to 
emphasise regional contingencies over the former Soviet 
threat, the US has shifted to a Base Force posture, which 
alms to be capable of fight ing two regional wars 
simultaneously. Beyond this, the strategy of 
"reconsti tution" requires the Uni ted States, despi te 
current reductions, to be abl e to regenerate global 
war-fighting capabilities above those already in the Base 
Force in the event that a 'supe rpower' should once agaln 
threaten.(16} 
Current US thinking has been reaffirmed by the Gulf War 
experlence, which resulted in a r ec asting of force 
structure and mobilisation pol i c y. The t hree Army National 
Guard combat brigades that we re d e signated active duty 
brigades (to "round out" divi si ons ) were never deployed 
(the 200,000 reserves called to ac tive duty served mostly 
I" 
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1n combat support roles) . As US Secretary of Defense, Dick 
Cheney, stated: 
It was unrealistic to expect part-time soldiers to 
maintain readiness rates as h igh as their active-duty 
counterparts ... Instead of usi ng guard combat brigades 
in future wars as integral parts of fast deploying 
divisions, they might bette r be organized into their 
own divisions that would be expected to train 90 to 
120 days before being sent into battle.(17) 
Cheney's assessment would not have been possible without 
the dramatically improved strategic circumstances 
pertaining in Europe. While thing s are far from settled on 
that continent, it is the absence of any imminent and large 
scale conventional threat which has made reliance on fewer 
active forces and slower-mobilising reserves possible.(18) 
The Gulf War, the decline of the Soviet Union as a threat, 
and subsequent reductions 
maJor reevaluation of 
identifiable threat 
US 
1n defence spending are caus1ng a 
force p lanning. The loss of an 
creates di fficulties as well as 
opportunities. The use of threat analysis as a basis for 
force structure planning 1S 
threat we now face is the 
no longer 
unknown, 
tenable: "The 
the uncertain. 
real 
The 
threat is instability and being prepared to handle a crisis 
or war that no one predicted or expected".(19) 
The implication for the concep t of warning time is that 
while resources may continue to b e devot e d to intelligence 
collection, and although warning time is said be to just as 
important as ever, tradi tiona I notions of the concept are 
gi ving way to new - but as ye t unformed - concepts. The 
1991 Joint Military Net Assessmen t states that: 
WPPISACI 327 
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In the past, operational planning assumptions and 
r esource programming analyses have treated warning and 
political decisions as s ingle events along the 
timeline of a major develop ing crisis. The realities 
of the emerging world o r de r have resulted in a 
refinement to the process. Thus, in the future, for a 
given regional threat, opera tional concepts will be 
developed and alternative for ce level analyses will be 
conducted to account for fo ur conditions of crisis 
onset: (1) slowbuilding cr ises; (2) fast-rising 
crises; (3) imminent conf li ct; and (4) conflict. 
This approach will illuminate the relationship between 
cost and risk as a funct i on of assumptions about 
warning and political decision time. It will allow a 
far more precise array of op tions for decisionmakers 
in resource allocation and theatre campaign 
planning.(20) 
This theme is developed furthe r in the US' 1992 National 
Military Strategy: 
Warning time, or available re sponse time, is far more 
likely to be exploited by key decisionmakers if they 
have a menu of options f r om which to choose. These 
options need to be pre-planned and gauged to a wide 
range of crises. This fu ndamental change to our 
military strategy is reflected in an adaptive planning 
process, through which p lanners develop mul tiple 
options keyed to specific cri ses.(21) 
These themes have been continued in subsequent defence and 
strategic documents issued by t he us. (22) While the new 
Clinton Administration has yet to make its detailed VIews 
known on a number of defence is sues, the methodology being 
developed in respect of wa rning time is unlikely to 
change. In essence, the United States is trying to come to 
grips with the fact that it no longer has an enemy against 
whom to plan. Traditional not ions of warning time on the 
NATO Cent r al Front relied heavily on a mechanistic 
assessment of likely Soviet act ions a nd - in particular -
speed of attack and mobilisation . Th is in turn, set the 
benchmark for US and NATO planning and , by extension, for 
force levels and readiness states . The use of threat based 
~ II 
II 
I! 
I, 
II 
I 
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planning against a singular and defined enemy has glven way 
to an attempt to define strategy according to a range of 
regional contingencies. without an identifiable threat, 
warning assessments must now be made against contingencies 
which are much less precise and which involve a greater 
se lect ion of potent i a 1 adversaries in a myri ad of 
settings. Consequently, the length of time 
warnlng and response is expected to vary and 
are now charged to have at hand a 'menu' 
responding to those possibilities. 
STRATEGIC WARNING TIME IN AUSTRALIAN THINKING 
avai lable for 
force planners 
of options for 
The treatment of warning in the Australian context has also 
undergone a significant evolution towards a no-threat based 
approach, but for rather different reasons and in quite 
different timescales to the US experience. In March 1951 
Prime Minister Menzies stated in the Australian Parliament 
that: 
The dangers of war have increased considerably. It is 
my belief that the state of the world is such that we 
cannot, and must not, give ourselves more than three 
years in which to get ready to defend ourselves. 
Indeed, three years is a liberal estimate.(23) 
Statements similar to this which focused on the 
requirements of mobilisation were largely focused on 
Australia's alliance commitments in forward theatres. It 
was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the 
environment was right for the development of a concept for 
the defence of Australia. Externally, there were a number 
of imperatives: the failure of the war in vietnam and, 
1973, the ending of Forward Defence following 
. ln 
the 
enunciation of the Guam Doctrine. Over the same period, a 
~U , 
II 
I, 
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number of important organisational chang e s were occurring 
in the wake of Fairhall and Tange.(2 4 ) 
Since the early seventies, and as de f e nce thinking began to 
focus on Australia's specific needs (as opposed to those of 
its allies), the concept of strategic wa r n ing time has been 
central to the intellectual logic of Australian defence 
planning. The notion of varying levels of threat 
developing over increasing time scales was first discussed 
ln the 1971 Strategic Basis of Austral i an Def ence Policy 
and, since then, in all subsequent pa pers of that 
classified series. (25) The 1973 St ra tegic Ba s i s o ffered a 
first definition of warning time as: 
... the time from Government acceptance of 
threat to the time it is judged it will 
operational response.(26) 
a pe r c ei ved 
r equ l re an 
It was within the Central Studies Establ ishment ( CSE) and 
the Joint Intelligence Organisation ( JIO) that qu a nt itative 
analysis of warning time was 
Beginning in the early 1970s, 
intended to relate warnlng 
needs of the core force.(27) 
first i n i tiated in Aus tralia. 
studies on warning time were 
assessments t o the exp anslon 
The work has c onti nued since 
then, with the completion of CSE r e ports in 1 975 and 1986 
(the latter was styled a "threat reco g ni tion and response 
model"), and a JIO (now the De fenc e Intelligence 
Organisation) report on warning t ime b e ing completed ln 
1990. (28) 
Alan Wrigley observes that there has bee n substantial 
continuity in warning assessments between t he mid-seventies 
and mid-eighties. (29) Focusing on the 19 76 white paper, 
and the 1981 and 1984 Parliamentary Joint Committee 
reports, Wrigley shows that all come to s i milar conclusions 
-~ I 
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regarding potential threats to Australia in kind, 
credibility and warning time.(30) Some differences over 
greater superpower tension in the mid-1980s are not 
material to the basic conclusion of all three papers that: 
... there was much continui ty in the determinants of 
Australia's strategic circumstances which, taken 
together, argued that major military threats against 
[Australia] were improbable and would, if they arose, 
be preceded by a series of developments. (31) 
Indeed, Wrigley's thesis bears extension: there has been a 
notable consistency stretching from 1971 into the early 
nineties in the assessments of official Australian papers 
(both classified and public) and parliamentary reports on 
the likely warning for threats facing Australia. As Dibb 
has also noted, while the period of warning has varied from 
seven to ten years, the most important conclusion has 
continued to be that Australia would receive prolonged 
warning of major attack.(32) 
The most recent defence whi te paper, Defence of Australia 
1987 (DOA87), was a particularly important document in the 
development of a st.rategy for the defence of Australia. 
The white paper confirmed earlier assessments on two 
points: firstly, that low-level threats to Australia could 
emerge quickly from forces already extant in the regIon. 
Secondly, the capability to mount an invasive threat to 
Australia did not currently exist - except in the united 
States and the (then) Soviet Union - and it would take many 
years to develop such a capacity from amongst regional 
powers during which time Australia would be able to 
respond.(33) 
In the absence of identifiable threats, 
based on the 'enduring features' 
planning was to be 
of the strategic 
~~ ~ 
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environment and the capabilities that could realistically 
be projected against Australia. Three levels of conflict 
were enumerated (low, escalated-low, and more substantial) 
and these replaced specific threats by creating 'generic' 
contingencies or threat classes. In this way, geography 
and regional capabilities provided the benchmark for force 
guidance and the test for capabilities, doctrine and 
readiness levels. 
In a notable departure from the Dibb Review however, DOA87 
discussed warning (but not warning time) in a far more 
general way. Indeed, DOA87 is generally imprecise about 
readiness requi rements and lead times, and is reluctant to 
specify actual time frames for warning. This approach was 
continued in 1989 with the production of a classified 
strategic review, known as Australia's Strategic Planning 
in the 1990s (ASP90).(34) Wrigley argues this approach has 
allowed the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to interpret 
strategic guidance as implying that there will be little or 
no warning of low level conflict. Consequently, there has 
been an excessive emphasis on being able to deal with the 
full gamut of regional capabilities currently In 
existence.(35) 
There may be some truth in Wrigley's observations, though 
he does not explore the reasoning behind the government's 
reluctance to be less predictive about strategic warning in 
public. Firstly, the 1975 and 1986 CSE studies on warnIng 
time had come in for much cri ticism: many fel t that they 
attempted to be predictive where they should not, and that 
they had used data that was not of direct relevance to 
Australia. (36) While both studies had been misinterpreted 
(neither sought to be predictive), this fact illustrated a 
broader problem wi th warning time estimates which took a 
II 
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"no-threat-for-so-many-years" approach. The mi rth wi th 
which the Whitlam Government's "no threat for 15 years 
assessment" had been treated was enough of a caution 
against similar claims in public.(37) Finally, and related 
to this, was a desire not to offend the sensibilities of 
regional states by implying that Australia found them 
threatening. 
As then Australian Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, explained: 
... when it came to [DOA87], we in fact avoided the 
term 'warning time'. What we set out there was the 
relationship between warning and defence preparation -
our simple theme being that warning is not something 
that starts on a given day, but is the process by 
which government adjusts defence planning to political 
and military developments. (38) 
In this comment, Beazley reflects what . 1S a un1que 
application of warning designed for specifically Australian 
needs. Conventional notions of strategic warning - as they 
had been developed and applied by NATO strategists 1n 
Europe - were found at an early stage to be inappropriate 
to Australia's strategic requirements. Even as early as 
1976, defence planners in Australia were de-emphasising the 
linear and scenario-specific nature of warning time being 
applied in the NATO setting. The 1976 Australian Strategic 
Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives (ASDAPO) and the 
subsequent Coalition Government's white paper reinterpreted 
the notion of warning time: it was to be used to enable 
defence and intelligence efforts to respond to changes 1n 
the strategic environment rather than as a response to a 
specific and identifiable threat.(39) 
Based on a system of warning indicators that have been 
progressively refined, warning time is intended to be a 
flexible notion able to guide force development over the 
longer term. Quoting Beazley again: 
Ii 
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It is not sensible to think of warning time as a 
finite period in which we will not be faced with 
military threat of any kind . Rather the concept 
provides a basis on which we c a n assess our own 
priorities for defence prepar a tion and the time scales 
for our own defence effort.(40) 
As ASP90 notes, that system of wa rning indicators focuses 
on capabi Ii ty as opposed to moti ve and intent , which are 
both held to be difficult to analyse and subject to 
change. (41) The nature of response is also a n important 
feature. As Dibb relates, the d ef e nc e force does not 
remain static until a threat has mate rialised. The concept 
of defence preparation time assume s tha t policy will be 
responSlve to change, that in t el ligence efforts will be 
vigilant and timely, that an expansion base 
timely response is maintained, and that lead 
remain within anticipated warning.(4 2) 
c a pable of 
time s wi 11 
Despite the reluctance of DOA87 t o deal firmly with the 
subject of warning time, it seems clear that work on the 
subject has continued to proceed within the defence 
community. Beazley gave a particul arly detailed outline of 
the concept to Parliament, outlining the key conclusions of 
work underway within JIO. (43) A major paper on strategic 
warning time was apparently begun within JIO in early 1988 
and completed two years later.(44) The major conclusion of 
that report, commissioned during Dibb' s leadership of the 
organisation, is that Australia faces no threat of maJor 
invasion (defined as a divi s i on group o f around 20,000 
personnel) to its north for at l eas t s even years. 
An area that remains unexplored however, is an assessment 
of warning for threats arising in the South Pacific. So 
long as Australian planning c o ncent r ated exp licitly on the 
.Wi ; 
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defence of continental Australia, a wider application for 
warnlng time in the region was no t warranted. Acti vi ties 
or threats beyond the continent woul d be tackled by forces 
intended primarily for the defence of Au stralia. However, 
both ASP90 and the 1991 Force St r ucture Review have 
identified a specific new role for the ADF which requlres 
the defence force to "contribute to t he national response 
to requests from South Pacific nations for security 
assistance, including incidents a ff ec ting the safety of 
Australian nationals". Unlike othe r t asks which would take 
the ADF beyond the continent, this r o le is said to require 
the purchase of dedicated capabilities, including a 
helicopter carrier. 
The new role calls into question the purity of the defence 
of Australia concept . It is also not supported by 
assessments of warning time and de fence preparation time. 
Presumably there is an onus on the ADF to ensure that, as 
with the other roles identified in ASP90, the defence force 
has the capabilities to do the job and that it can expand 
in a timely fashion should threat l e vels rlse . Whi Ie the 
concepts of warning and defence preparation underpin 
current levels of capability for the eight other roles of 
the ADF, there does not seem to be similar guidance for the 
South Pacific role. 
CONCLUSION 
The contrasting approaches adopt e d by the u nited States and 
Australia to the application of str ategic warning time 
raise interesting questions about the use of the concept ln 
New Zealand's circumstances. The absence or existence of 
threat can be seen to make a large diffe rence to the type 
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of warning time model employed, and to subsequent guidance 
for force development. 
The use of warning time on the NATO Central Front provides 
a useful example of how the concept is applied ln an 
environment that is very specific about threat, operating 
environment and response. A reciprocal fear of surprlse 
attack - to adopt Schelling's terminology - made strategic 
warnlng vital to NATO's defensive integrity. 
Threat/response cycles were largely operational in nature: 
they provided guidance for readiness levels and alert 
phases, and were relatively narrow in the range of 
variables which they considered. 
The end of the Cold War has led to a reassessment by the 
Uni ted States of how it wi 11 use warning time in the 'new 
world order'. Recent US policy statements indicate the 
adoption of a more discrete conceptualisation of warnlng 
time keyed to different regions and to different types of 
conflict within regions. Efforts by the US to broaden its 
interpretation of warning away from a strongly threat-based 
model reflect a more complex and sophisticated approach 
which may have some application to New Zealand. As will be 
discussed further below, though on a much reduced scale, 
New Zealand also faces dilemmas in its defence planning as 
a result of a diffuse and ambiguous threat environment. 
An important limitation of the US approach should be noted, 
however. The post-Cold War warning model remains very 
undeveloped and still appears to be 'operationally' focused 
on alert levels and short term response. The connection 
to, and implications for, the Uni ted States ' regenerative 
capaci ty and reconsti tution forces does not seem to have 
been well thought through. Any application to New 
Zealand's situation would have to address this shortcoming. 
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For Australia, the lack of a specific threat denied, as it 
has done for the Uni ted States in more recent years, the 
benchmark most often used by other countries against which 
to plan defence needs. Instead, geography and other 
enduring features have become the key to guidance. The 
adoption of 'credible contingencies' and ' levels of 
conflict' has provided a surrogate for specific threats and 
a more coherent basis for planning. 
In contrast to the US experience, the Australian approach 
has seen warning and defence preparation time used in the 
force development process as a tool to inform alterations 
to force structure planning and readiness over the long 
run, rather than as a guide for operational response in the 
short term. The concept is seen in a far less 
'mechanistic' way than it has been in Europe, reflecting 
the fact that, for Australia, the emergence of a threat 
(except at a low level) will not normally require an 
immedi ate oper a tiona I response, but is more I ike ly to have 
implications over the longer term. Furthermore, Australian 
treatment of the subject reflects greater concern over the 
very real problems of perception, including recognlslng 
when warning time has started, and establishing what 
exactly constitutes a threat to the national interest. 
The Australian approach offers one method of defence 
planning which seeks to overcome the absence of threat. 
The overlap between Australia's and New Zealand's strategic 
outlook suggests that there may be some lessons here for 
New Zealand. As we shall discuss further below however, 
the largest obstacle to applying the Australian experience 
to New Zealand is that focusing force structure on a 
'defence of New Zealand' strategy would not meet New 
Zealand's wider security interests. 
II 
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Chapter Two 
CONCEPTUALISING STRATEGIC WARNI NG TIME 
INTRODUCTION 
In broad terms, warning occurs at three levels. Poli tical 
warnlng refers to the full range of variables affecting 
relations between states; analys is at this level is wide 
and long range. Strategic warni ng is normally also long 
range in its outlook and, although it includes 
consideration of political, economic and other variables, 
its focus is more military and security. Finally, 
operational warning refers to the acti vi ties of mi Ii tary 
forces, usually in the context of a specific threat 
environment, where conflict is h appening or may happen. 
These levels should not be treated as mutually exclusive or 
as necessarily sequential in time: there are many possible 
scenarios where two or all three cou ld occur at once. 
But the level of analysis at which one a pproaches the 
subject 
warning. 
time to 
warnlng 
has large implications for t he application of 
This paper refers always to strategic warnlng 
reflect the fact that t he focus here is not just 
and response at the oper a tiona l level of warfare, 
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but warning as a planning concept. Our interest ln 
primarily to identify the key elements of warning and its 
value as a defence planning tool. A difficulty arlses 
however, because the notion of warning time has been most 
developed and applied at the ope r a tional level. The 
preoccupation of the literature and of defence planners 
with this level of warning obscures t h e v a l ue and potential 
application of warning as a planning too l. 
This chapter discusses the notion o f s tra t egic warning time 
ln a more abstract sense, drawing o n the case studies 
outlined above. After reviewing a n umber of technical 
definitions, differing approaches to wa r ni ng time are 
examined by looking at three questi o ns: the purpose of 
warnlng, what is being warned of, a nd the issue of who lS 
being warned. 
TERMS 
Prior to dealing with these issues however, it is important 
to clarify a number of commonly used terms since they also 
have a time dimension and have a d irect relationship to the 
warnlng process ln defence planning. Lea d time and 
preparation time are commonly used to indicate the process 
of preparing the armed forces fo r military operations. 
Lead time refers to the integra tion of pe rsonnel and 
equipment into the force structure s uc h that they are 
capable of operational deployment. Idea lly , lead time 
should be a function of warning time ; that lS, warnlng 
assessments should influence s uc h t hing s as procurement 
patterns, training and maintenance cycles, and so forth in 
response to a changing strategic environment. 
! , 
r 
w 
WPPISAC1 327 
32 
Preparation time is the t i me taken t o prepare personnel and 
equipment for a spec i fic o pe r a tional deployment. The 
ideal, again, is that prepa r a t i o n time should be driven by 
warn1ng assessments and the t i me required for preparation 
should be wi thin estimates of wa rning. Preparation time 
includes such things as traini ng, mobilisation, planning, 
and transit of forces. 
Readiness specifies the deg r ee o f notice - usually measured 
1n months, days or hours tha t forces would have to 
prepare for deployment. Read i ness states are normally 
p r edetermined and aimed at ac h iev ing specific objectives 
(for example, to provide a n o perational battalion of 
infantry, drawn from the rese rves, within three months) 
according to estimates of the warning and preparation time 
likely to be available. Obvious ly the intention is to have 
forces at readiness states which are less than the combined 
total of warning and preparation time. 
In the previous chapter, a commo n NATO-style definition of 
warn1ng time was quoted: tha t is, "the time available 
between the evident understandi ng that the Warsaw Pact 1S 
prepar1ng for an attack and the actual outbreak of 
hostilities". Some Australia n writers have adopted a 
similar approach by defining warning time as "the time 
taken from government acceptance of a perceived threat to 
the time i t is judged a n operational response will be 
required". (1) Definitions suc h as these are applicable at 
the operational level of wa r f are and planning. They also 
provide a useful 
historical context 
guide 
(as 
fo r e xamining warning time 1n an 
1 s done in Annex A to thi s paper). 
But for r easons which a re outlined in greater detail below, 
they are of limited value whe n a pp li e d in a planning sense 
at the strategic level, o r in circumstances where a threat 
1S not well defined. 
~ 
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WARNING FOR WHAT PURPOSE? 
The objective of warning time assessments is broad and its 
application can differ depending on the setting, the threat 
environment facing a defender, and also according to which 
organisation or even individual amongst the defender is 
being considered. The literature on 'surprise attack' 
tells us that the most important function of strategic 
warning is to give timely and accurate alert of surprise 
attack, since unexpected assault on an unprepared defender 
glves enormous advantages to an aggressor.(2) In this 
sense, warnlng time focuses heavily on the use of the 
concept to inform operational responses and alert levels. 
As noted in the previous chapter, this was the principal 
application of the concept on NATO's Central Front during 
the Cold War. 
But while warning time is traditionally seen as an alert 
mechanism, another function is to act as a planning tool 
over a longer time frame. At this broader level, the 
objective of warning is to ensure the efficient and timely 
preparedness of one's overall defence capability ln 
response to an evolving security environment. This 
approach better describes the Australian conceptualisation 
of warning time as it was outlined above. It allows the 
state to take advantage of a propitious security 
environment and also seeks to avoid being surprised by 
developments, such as the emergence of a threat, which may 
be detrimental to its security. 
Without any notion of threat levels, a defence force could 
be expected to provide an average level of capability over 
It 
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time as a guard against all conceivable threats on the 
spectrum. This would be both inefficient in times of 
peace, and irresponsible in times of instability. Warning 
can be an aid to narrowing the range of possible options 
facing defence planners: 
This allows a greater capability to be brought to bear 
against the threat when its likelihood of 
materializing is high, than could be maintained 
against that threat on an ongoing basis during periods 
when it is but one of many low-probabil i ty 
possibilities.(3) 
Thus, by discounting the unlikely and the incredible, a 
defence planner will know what doesn't have to be prepared 
for. Conversely, by identifying credible threats and their 
likely time frames, planners are able to concentrate 
resources In both time and space. In short, an effective 
strategic warning system acts as a narrowing mechanism, 
helping a defence force to be ready in some places some of 
the time, rather than in all places all of the time. 
As noted in the Introduction to this paper, it is the 
problem of long time frames that makes planning for defence 
particularly difficult. The life cycle of major pieces of 
equipment runs into decades, while research and thinking on 
procurement begins many years earlier. Nor is it just a 
matter of 
integrating 
long, and 
equipment, but also 
new technology and so 
because the future IS 
of training 
on. As lead 
unknown, the r e 
personnel, 
times are 
are very 
large choices to be made, and risks to be taken, In 
structuring defence forces.(4) 
As Quinlan notes, the 'imperative of choice' manifests 
itself to defence planners in a number of ways, two of 
which are particularly relevant to the purpose of strateg i c 
'.\; 
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warnlng time. Firstly, there is what Quinlan calls the 
relative priority to be assigned between the near and the 
long term. By that he means the balance of forces between 
those 'in-being' and those 'in reserve'. Secondly, and 
related to this, is the issue of readiness states, not just 
for operational forces, but also for those forces intended 
for regeneration and reconstitution. (5) 
Strategic warning is not the sole source of information for 
determining these features of the force structure, but it 
is the most important. Warning time will have less direct 
impact on other aspects of defence planning, but can help 
bring greater certainty to judgments about capability 
procurement priorities and doctrinal developments. 
WARNING OF WHAT? 
The monitoring of the strategic environment, particularly 
the identification of threats, is normally the substance of 
a warning time assessment. A common defini tion of threat 
has it that "Threat [is] judged in terms of both the 
capabilities and the intentions of a potential enemy, or 
combination of enemies".(6) Detailed models of threat 
assessment, which make up an important part of traditional 
warnlng time models, will seek to use Early Warning 
Indicators (EWI) to track and quantify the emergence (or 
dissipation) of threat over time. The objective is to 
ascertain when that threat has crossed a threshold 
requiring some form of warning or response. EWI are 
intended to provide unambiguous evidence of significant 
change in the environment; that is, to separate out 
meaningful data from irrelevant or conflicting background 
, no i s e' . (7) 
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Taken individually or as unbalanced groups, EWI would be of 
limited utility. The purpose of monitoring broad ranges of 
key variables is to provide patterns of signals by which to 
warn of future events. Before passing to the next phase of 
the threat/response cycle, indicators are separated from 
background noise, interpreted, integrated, weighted, and 
examined within the context of other EWI to see if a 
pattern emerges. If a 
tracked until a certain 
pattern is identified 
thresho ld of 'danger' 
it 
or 
wi 11 be 
'threat' 
is crossed, at which point a warning is given in the next 
stage of the threat/response cycle. 
There is a large body of literature on the formal study of 
intelligence cycles and issues relating to the collection, 
interpretation and use of warning information. (8) Many of 
the issues go beyond the present discussion, but an 
important overlap should be noted in the debate regarding 
use of operational warning cycles at the strategic level. 
Typically, operational intelligence cycles, when applied to 
the strategic setting, prove unsophisticated, are unable to 
cope with variation, and have a limited outlook in terms of 
time and range of observation. Their focus on the 
identification of 'threats' makes them of limited use to 
longer term force structure planning a theme that IS 
discussed in more detail below. 
Furthermore, in assessing threat, appreciations of motive 
and intent, as Australian strategic guidance has noted, are 
extremely difficult to make. Both are difficult to assess 
and can change quickly. For this reason 
typically tend to concern themselves with 
more reliable and constant indicator 
defence planners 
cap"abi 1 i ty as a 
of long range 
strategic developments. And one which, because of the 
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long-term nature of capability procurement, 
longer-term responses from defence planners. 
WARNING FOR WHOM AND AT WHAT LEVEL? 
requIres 
Closely related are questions of "From whose eyes are we 
viewing warning?", and "At what level is warning taking 
place?". There is a complex issue here about who is doing 
the perceiving, who is being warned, and at what level. 
Many actors are involved in the warning and response 
cycle: diplomatic staff and intelligence agencies will 
collect information; analysts will distil and interpret 
it; their superiors will consider its significance; 
political leaders will be alerted if necessary; and 
defence planners will react depending on the time 
available by re-configuring force structures, procurIng 
new equipment or deploying forces in response. 
To consider the value of warning at its broadest level - as 
a planning tool and not merely as an operational alert 
mechanism - it must be the government which is the focus of 
examination. It is only at this level that the political, 
economic and military activities of the state can be 
coordinated. From the operational perspective, it is not 
enough that government agencies or personne 1 be "wa rned" : 
history is replete with examples of surprise attack despite 
varIOUS actors amongst the defenders having had warning. A 
warnIng cannot be considered effective until it reaches a 
decision-maker capable of acting on it. 
It does not follow, however, that the warning and response 
process should be dependent upon formal and constant 
,f 
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political involvement. Strategic warning should feed into 
a defence planning system, allowing force structure to 
change and alter to suit an evolving strategic 
environment. In this sense responses should avoid being 
held hostage to a decision about when 'warning has begun'. 
Such an approach is too categorical. It is also likely to 
be highly focused on a narrow definition of threat, rather 
than being responsive to strategic developments in general. 
A further issue relat ing to 'Who is being wa rned?' is the 
importance of perception and misperception. Whi Ie we might 
view warning from the perspective of government, it should 
not be assumed that this equates to a view of the state as 
a uni tary or rational actor. The state is nei ther: at 
each step in the warning and response cycle, individuals 
and organisations perceive and react in their own right. 
At each level there 1S opportunity for 'objective' 
information to be distorted, mishandled and ignored. 
Indeed, many have argued that it is these factors which are 
the major cause of warning failures. As Betts notes: 
... there are no significant cases of bolts out of the 
blue in the twentieth century. All major sudden 
attacks occurred in situations of prolonged tension, 
during which the victim state's leaders recognized 
that war might be on the horizon.(9) 
Betts' comment refers specifically to warning and response 
at the operational level, but we might apply it at the 
broader planning level as well. Invariably there is always 
information available for defence planners; indicators are 
there but they are too frequently ignored, interpreted 
incorrectly or mishandled. Timely and accurate warning is 
not just a matter of detection, but of assessment and 
application in the planning process. Problems of human 
psychology, ethnocentric slants, misperception, conflicting 
.. 
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interests, political competition, organisational biases, 
and poor internal management systems are all factors which 
prevent the effective use of warning. Even in cases where 
a threat is accurately assessed by officials, governments 
may be reluctant to act for a number of reasons. They may, 
for example, not believe the assessments produced by 
officials, or they may prefer to delay the expense and 
trouble of improving readiness states and capabilities. In 
short, successful warning is more dependent upon psychology 
and politics than on technology, organisation or 
information. Warning is vitally important, but the real 
issue, at the end of the day, is response. 
A lesson therefore, for the development of warning time is 
that while warning indicators may exist 'objectively' In 
the strategic environment, there are barriers to our 
ability to perceive events accurately and react 
appropriately. One of the purposes of developing and 
formalising the notion of warning time is to strip away 
such blinkers from the warning and response cycle, or at 
least to minimise them, and to extend our abi Ii ty to see 
events objectively. 
CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF WARNING TIME 
The traditional notion of warning time and its relationship 
to lead and preparation times can be thought of as a linear 
'time line'. The time line is typical of the classic 
, mobilisation ' approach to strategic warning and 
illustrates how Early Warning Indicators are intended to 
generate warning assessments, followed by alerts and 
responses. Depending on the amount of time involved, the 
response may vary from re-configuring force structures over 
.. 
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a number of years, to mobilising reserves, to an immediate 
retaliatory strike. The linear approach outlined here 
provides a clear and parsimonious model of warning time -
and there is certainly value in that. However, a number of 
difficulties should be noted. 
Firstly, the model is threat-driven and depends upon the 
existence and accurate identification of a threat to 
provide guidance for defence planners an approach which 
the 1991 Australian Wrigley Report dismissed as divisive 
and confusing, "inevitably speculative and almost entirely 
hypothetical". (10) The intention of threat-based planning 
(as with any planning) is to make the business of defence 
predictable and to allow the defence force to concentrate 
and priori tise. From threats planners are able to create 
detailed scenarios of when and how conflict may occur, who 
the participants might be, what their objectives might be, 
what capabilities and tactics they might use and, 
therefore, what is required of a defender to deter or 
defeat an opponent. The aim of such an approach is to 
maximise the effect of limited resources by introducing an 
element of specialisation, and to concentrate forces 
against a specific opponent in both time and space. The 
advantage is that specific guidance for the defence force 
and, if time allows, for the development of a force 
structure, can be gained. 
One obvious disadvantage of a threat driven model is that, 
in the absence of threat, little guidance can be gained for 
the force structure: the warning system breaks down and 
planning is driven by other factors. A related problem 
occurs where threats are ambiguous. From 
point of view, this can lead to a lack of 
force structure decisions, both over time 
a bureaucr a tic 
consistency in 
and across the 
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organisation. At the military level, force development 
decisions will be based on strategic assessments which may 
turn out to be erroneous or simply lagging behind changes 
1n the strategic environment. The consequences could be 
varied, including ignorance of political, technological and 
econom1C developments, through to failure to foresee an 
attack. 
The tendency of warning time assessments to posit actual 
time frames accentuates these concerns: the 1975 warning 
time paper produced by the Australian Department of 
Defence's Central Studies Establishment 1S a case 1n 
point.(ll) Although the study did not claim to be 
predictive about the future, it attracted criticism for 
focusing on threats of little relevance to Australia and 
for the way in which it applied quantitative historical 
analysis to Australia's unique circumstances. (12) 
Another limitation of the threat driven model is that 
warn1ng assessments have a tendency to adopt a 'worst-case' 
approach. The resul t is a lowering of the threshold for 
responding to emerging threats and this is expenS1ve 1n 
terms of readiness levels and the spectrum of capabilities 
required to be maintained. It is also potentially 
destabilising in an environment where an overly-aggressive 
response would serve to fuel misperception and an arms 
race. A worst case approach can also result in a loss of 
credibility for the warning system if it is seen to 'cry 
wolf' too often. 
Simple linear models of strategic warning also focus (and 
respond) on a bilateral basis to a single threat. The 
approach will not cope easily with multiple threats 
emanating from a number of sources, at various levels of 
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the conflict spectrum, and over differing time frames. 
This difficulty arises wi th many types of threat/response 
cycle through the over-concentration of Western defence 
planners on the use of the concept to inform military 
responses and alert levels at the operational level. 
Since the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1942 and Roberta 
Wohlstetter's subsequent analysis, a large body of 
Ii terature has been bui I t around the problem of surprlse 
attack and the place of warning in averting it. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, this emphasis has its foundations 
ln the attention which Western scholars and strategists 
have given to the most demanding and immedi ate issues of 
the Cold War; namely, conventional war in Central Europe 
and problems surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. The 
Cold War provided a specific threat environment with 
relatively well defined parameters, placing a premium on a 
model of warning which was inherently operational rather 
than strategically or politically based. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A PREFERRED MODEL OF STRATEGIC WARNING 
Noting these limitations on traditional notions of warnlng 
time, and prior to applying the concept of strategic 
warning to New Zealand's circumstances, we might summarlse 
some general features of a preferred model for strategic 
warning which would avoid the difficulties outlined above. 
Firstly, the model should not be dependent on threats ln 
order to function - though obviously it should be able to 
accommodate them if they emerge. In a low threat 
environment, where information and EWI are likely to be 
ambiguous and difficult to quantify, the model must still 
be able to provide an output that is applicable to force 
planning. 
..... 
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The model also needs to be capable of accommodating an 
environment where tasks are multiple and diffuse. In other 
words, it should be multi-tracked and able to respond 
multilaterally - as opposed to single tracked and operating 
bilaterally. The model should also be able to deal 
flexibly with problems which may emerge unexpectedly at 
some advanced point; that is, it must be able to cope with 
strategic surprise. 
In the elaboration of EWI, the model should focus on those 
which are capability oriented, rather than including intent 
and motive. While the latter factors will be important to 
an overall national response, from a defence planning 
perspective, it is change in capabi Ii ty that is the most 
reliable and consistent warning indicator. 
In terms of response, the 
pre-determined in its outcome. 
time perspective, there should 
model should avoid being 
By providing an extended 
be greater flexibility to 
admit a range of responses from, say, diplomatic action to 
pre-emptive strike. By introducing greater flexibility the 
cycle should be reversible in the sense that early 
identification of a deteriorating environment could lead to 
responses which prevent further deterioration, or which 
actually improve the strategic environment. 
An ideal warning model should aim to provide the defence 
force with warning within expected lead and preparation 
times. To achieve this, it is also necessary that the 
model and its output is accepted within the defence 
planning system as a guide to force expansion and readiness 
levels. 
-..... 
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Connected to this is the necessi ty for the nature of the 
model and the assessments that it provides to be acceptable 
to not only those in the defence planning communi ty, but 
also to a wider constituency within the public serVlce 
bureaucracy and government and, to a lesser degree, within 
the medi a and academi a . This issue goes well beyond the 
brief of the 
Alan Wrigley 
fundamental 
current discussion, but, as the 
ln the Introduction to this paper 
to the practical application 
assessments in defence planning terms. 
quote from 
notes, it is 
of warnlng 
In terms of force structure development, notions of warnlng 
time and associated concepts of preparation cannot provide 
all the necessary guidance. However, the model should 
bring greater certainty to the problem of long time-scales 
in defence planning terms. By that we mean warning times 
can provide guidance as to the balance between the force in 
being and reserves, and also to readiness levels. Warning 
notions would also provide information for the weighting of 
capability procurement priorities within the planning 
process. 
Footnotes 
1 The definition is Graeme Cheeseman's, although 1M 
Speedy's wording is very similar. See Cheeseman (p 
30) and Speedy (p 68 fn 2) in Desmond Ball and JO 
Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilisation in the Defence 
of Australia (1980). 
2 For an introduction to the problems and lssues 
surrounding strategic surprise see Ephraim Kam , 
Surprise Attack: The victim's Perspective (1988). 
4l1li 
I 
WPPISACI 327 
3 
45 
Ralph Strauch, Strategic Warning 
Look at the Conceptual Issues, 
1979), P 36. 
and General War: A 
Rand Note (October 
4 Quinlan (1992), op cit, P 161. 
5 Ibid, pp 161-62. 
6 Threats to Australia's Security Their Nature and 
Probability (Katter Report), Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence (1982), p vi. 
7 The term 'noise' was adopted from communication theory 
by Roberta Wohlstetter and refers to the background of 
inconsistent or irrelevant information. Roberta 
Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision 
(1965), p 691. 
8 See for example Strauch (1979), op ci t; Richard K 
9 
10 
11 
Betts, Surprise Attack (1982) ; Richard K Betts, 
"Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence 
Failures are Inevitable", World Politics, 31 (1) 
October 1978, pp 61-89; and Handel (1984), loc cit. 
With particular application to the South Pacific, see 
Ken Ross, "Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South 
Pacific Case Study", Canberra Papers on Strategy and 
Defence No 65 (1990). 
Betts (1982), op cit, p 18. 
Wrigley (1990), op cit, p 33. 
AT Ross, An Analysis of Warning Periods 
with Major Conflicts 1939-73, CSE Working 
of Defence, Canberra (1975). 
Associated 
Paper, Dpt 
12 The Katter Report, for example, rej ected the CSE study 
on the grounds that it "tended to relate to contiguous 
states with long histories of friction rather than 
cases of trans-oceanic attack". Katter Report (1981), 
op cit, p 39, para 2.35. 
..... 
!(: : . 
, 
WPPISAC1 327 
INTRODUCTION 
46 
CHAPTER THREE 
STRATEGIC WARNING IN 
NEW ZEALAND 
Having looked at the application of strategic warnlng ln 
two settings and discussed its nature in the abstract, this 
chapter turns to an examination of the New Zealand 
experience. The concept of warning time has historically 
had little impact on New Zealand defence planning ln any 
formal sense and the reasons for this are discussed. The 
levels of warning available to New Zealand for past 
deployments will be reviewed and the basis of New Zealand 
strategic thinking will be outlined, 
approaches to warning time. 
including current 
NOTIONS OF WARNING IN NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY THINKING 
Since 1945 and even earlier, the New Zealand Government has 
assessed that any invasive threat of New Zealand would need 
to be mounted and sustained over vast distances. There 
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have been - and continue to be - few countries in the world 
with the offensive naval and air capability necessary to 
indulge in such an expedition. An exercise of this nature 
would be enormously risky relative either to the spoils 
that New Zealand has to offer or to its strategic 
importance. Despite these reassurlng factors ln New 
Zealand's strategic position, there have remained residual 
concerns that the securi ty afforded by distance may also 
prove a liability should sea lanes be cut, thus preventing 
trade and resupply. As Ian MacGibbon has observed: 
Underlying New Zealand's approach to defence in 1945 
were three primary assumptions: that she could only 
be seriously threatened physically by a major power; 
that against such a threat she could not be defended 
wi th the New Zea land resources avai lable; and that 
her defence problem was, in any case, more than a 
matter merely of physical protection, so dependent was 
she on external trade.(l) 
As MacGibbon goes on to argue, the New Zealand response to 
this dilemma in 1945 and since, has been to opt for a 
posture of collective security as a means to ensure that 
other countries would be vitally interested should New 
Zealand's economic or physical security be jeopardised. 
Depending on the political leaning of the government of the 
day, this stance has been pursued through the United 
Nations or through membership of such security arrangements 
and treaties as ANZUS, SEATO and the FPDA. In the 
country's first post-war defence review, Holland's National 
government established a turn of phrase that was to 
epitomise this outlook: 
We must rely for our securi ty on the power of our 
allies ... Acceptance of this simple fact has led 
successive Governments over the years to base their 
defence policy on joining with other like-minded 
nations in a common effort to find the most effective 
means of protection against aggression.(2) 
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And in 1961: 
If our policy is one of collective security we must 
retain the confidence and support of the countries on 
whose assistance we rely ... To do this we must join 
with them in defending what they regard as their vital 
interests as well as our own, and make the best 
contribution we can.(3) 
There is not space here to fully discuss the evolution of 
New Zealand defence policy since 1945, or the changing 
nature of commitments and threat perceptions. The key 
point for present purposes is that since 1945 defence 
policy has rested on faith in collective security efforts, 
as expressed in Article 51 of the united Nations Charter. 
Defence strategy for New Zealand, therefore, has been 
collective in principle and forward in practice. Even the 
ruptures in domestic politics which occurred during the 
Vietnam War and, more notably, over the entry of nuclear 
warships, did not disturb this continuity. (4) 
For New Zealand then, and in similar fashion to Australia, 
the concept of strategic 
tied to mobilisation or 
needs of all ies (such as 
division in the Middle 
outbreak of conflict).(5) 
warnlng has always been closely 
preparation in response to the 
the 1949 commi tment to provide a 
East within six months of the 
The notion of 'warning time' was 
not a consideration in the sense that it is being treated 
here. What mattered to defence planners in New Zealand was 
simply lead and preparation time being given enough 
notice to assemble an expeditionary force in response to 
allied requests for assistance. As MacGibbon notes, 
The emphasis was entirely upon 'global war' 
requirements, that is, the training of large bodies of 
men rather than the development of balanced, mobile, 
well equipped forces in New Zealand itself . (6) 
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Indeed, so long as New Zealand formed only an adjunct to 
larger allied formations, then warning assessments were 
largely academic: every threat to an ally became 
conceivably a threat against which New Zealand should 
plan. Since this was obviously absurd, Defence chiefs took 
the view that a 'well trained body of men' would suffice on 
most occasions, and that so long as larger allies could 
handle the crisis at the beginning, New Zealand would have 
time to mobilise. Without a direct threat to New Zealand, 
and lacking an independent capacity for collecting 
intelligence, New Zealand's ability or need to establish a 
clear connection between strategic guidance and capability 
procurement was not a priority. 
Following the Korean War, the nature of defence, especially 
Army, structures began to change. The need for readily 
available forces, rather than slow-mobilising non-regulars 
became increasingly apparent in New Zealand's regional 
commi tments. Since the 1970s, that trend has accelerated 
and there has been a gradual movement towards the 
establishment of forces able to act more autonomously of 
allied formations. In response to the 1969 Guam doctrine, 
the Bri tish decision to wi thdraw 'east of Suez', and the 
expansion of the Soviet Union into the region, there was 
... a substantial shift in New Zealand's defence roles 
and force deployments in South-east Asia and the 
Pacific and, what is more important, of the concepts 
underlying the role of forces.(7) 
The 1978 Defence Review reflected new regionally-focused 
priori ties and made the "securi ty around (New Zea land) a 
key objective". The review called for the development of 
capabilities able to respond to "low-key emergencies in our 
region", as well as the upholding of wider national 
...... 
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interests.(8) The 1978 paper also heralded the withdrawal 
of New Zealand troops from Singapore, though they did not 
finally depart until 1989. 
The 1983 and 1987 reviews developed this regional theme 
and, aside from the issue of nuclear ship visits (which was 
taken up in the latter) the two papers exhibited almost 
identical priori ties: both argued that the South Pacific 
was New Zealand's area of primary strategic concern, within 
which New Zealand should promote securi ty and stabi Ii ty. 
Both reviews recommended that New Zealand should have the 
ability "to be able to mount an effective military response 
to any low level contingency within our area of direct 
strategic concern".(9) 
The Labour Government's 1987 white paper further developed 
this line. That paper was seminal for a number of 
reasons: firstly, it established New 
anti-nuclear policy in a defence policy document. 
Zealand's 
I tal so 
placed far more emphasis on the relationship with Australia 
some fourteen paragraphs were devoted to this topic 
compared to one in the previous defence reVIew. Thirdly, 
the paper emphasised the importance of operations In the 
South Pacific, implying a force structure designed 
primarily for operations In that area and suited to low 
level operations. These aspects have been much remarked 
upon by commentators, but they have obscured another which 
is also worthy of note and of particular relevance to the 
present discussion. 
Heavily influenced by the Australian Dibb review which had 
just been completed in that country, the 1987 New Zealand 
whi te paper embodied a conceptual development in thinking 
about the defence of New Zealand - as opposed to thinking 
"""'l1lI 
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about how New Zealand could contribute to the defence of 
allies. The paper argued for greater operational and 
infrastructural self reliance, and concluded that: 
For the first time we have adopted in formal policy 
terms the concept that the New Zealand armed forces 
will have the capability to operate independently, 
although more likely in concert with Australia, to 
counter low level contingencies in our region of 
direct strategic concern.(10) 
The newly-elected National Government's 1991 defence white 
paper reflected a significant reorientation on a number of 
points: the too narrow geographical focus of the 1987 
paper was replaced by the equally surreal view that New 
Zealand should maintain a force structure capable of 
responding - in partnership with others - to contingencies 
anywhere 
warfare. 
ln the world up to mid-level conventional 
The anti-nuclear legislation, though still ln 
place, was cited for having led to a decline in the 
professionalism of the Defence Force and for making full 
cooperation with traditional allies unattainable. 
Despite the obvious (and important) differences surrounding 
the anti-nuclear stance and the geographical extent of New 
Zealand's defence interests, however, the two papers 
exhibited more than a modicum of continuity in their 
strategic assessments of threats to New Zealand. 
white paper reaffirms the 1987 assessment that: 
The 1991 
New Zealand is fortunate to have no visible or 
foreseeable threat of armed invasion. It is 
reasonable to assume that there would be considerable 
warning time for an event of such magnitude ... (11) 
In seeking to compensate for the perceived isolationism of 
the 1987 paper however, and also in response to the 
vanished Soviet threat to the Pacific, DONZ91 adopted a 
...... 
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more 'internationalist' approach, in which the South 
Pacific was de-emphasised. Despite this, a number of 
important themes remained: compared to defence reviews of 
the early sixties and before, the Pacific and Asia received 
most attention; the relationship with Australia continued 
to be singled out as fundamental to New Zealand's 
security; and the prescription for a limited military 
capacity for self reliance in the South Pacific was also 
repeated. 
Defence policy papers of the last two decades reflect 
changes in New Zealand's external strategic circumstances 
as well as important developments in domestic politics. In 
geographic terms, the focus for combat scenarios has become 
more concentrated on Southeast Asia, Australia and the 
Southwest Pacific. Calls for greater 'self reliance' also 
found expression in terms of capabilities. The 1978 
defence white paper called for the acquisition of a 
logistic support ship, an oil tanker was purchased, and an 
all-arms, self contained Ready Reaction Force (RRF) was 
created in 1984. 
Greater attention has also been brought to bear on the 
conduct of operations in the South Pacific the only 
theatre where New Zealand forces could conceivably operate 
alone. Increased maritime surveillance and the initiation 
of the Golden Fleece exercises in 1989 gave substance to 
which practised thi s . The Go Iden Fleece exercises, 
scenarios for 
governments, 
development 
providing assistance to South Pacific Island 
also provided the first genuine avenue for the 
of joint force operations by the NZDF. 
Furthermore, structural and legislative changes to 
defence's higher command under the 1990 Defence Act 
provided for the creation of joint force commanders under a 
Chief of Defence Force. 
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Change has, however, been slow and has occurred at the 
margIns. Calls for a logistic support ship remaIn 
unrealised, while the concept of the RRF has provided very 
limited independent capacity to project power (especially 
without sealift), even for low level operations in the 
Southwest Pacific.(12) Accounts of the first Golden Fleece 
exerCIse reinforce the view that the abi Ii ty to operate 
independently is heavily constrained not only in terms of 
capabilities, but also because joint force doctrines are 
underdeveloped. (13) The second Golden Fleece exerCIse, 
scheduled for 1993, has been deferred in order to release 
funds to pay for New Zealand's peacekeeping commitments in 
Somalia.(14) 
Peter Jennings has concluded that the 1987 whi te paper's 
claim to have introduced greater self-reliance "is not 
borne 
weapons 
changes 
greater 
out on a close examination of the 
acquisition projects".(lS) And 
in operational doctrine, which were 
emphasis to independent operations 
Pacific, as "minor". (16) 
Government's 
he describes 
meant to give 
In the South 
The gap between rhetoric and reality is illustrated further 
In the area of defence planning where the concept of 
formally linking strategic developments to capability 
acquisition has not been well developed. As Jennings 
observed in 1987, "a policy of systematically linking force 
structure planning to wider strategic assessments is still 
lacking".(17) Five years later, Stewart Woodman also noted 
that 
l 
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New Zealand's (defence) planning ... has been changeable 
and lacked a rigorous analytical underpinning ... force 
structure planning has been largely ad hoc and done 
little more than shuffle the mix of capabilities 
originally acquired in the late 1960s. While the 
defence tasks set out in The Defence of New Zea land 
1991 provide a useful tool for program budgeting 
purposes, they provide little practical guidance for 
defining force structure characteristics and 
priorities nor for determining the balance between 
major capability acquisitions and other areas of 
defence activity.(18) 
Possibly that gap will be filled by the new 'Defence 
Planning System' which was inaugurated in 1992. That 
system seeks to "integrate strategic guidance, defence 
tasks and capabi Ii ties, planning and forecasting, and 
capital equipment procurement" in one "single chain of 
logic".(19) However, Rolfe also notes that this new 
planning system 
before and, if 
. 
1S 
that 
little 
1S so, 
rema1n to be addressed. (20) 
different from what has 
the problems identified 
gone 
above 
Thus, defence planning has also moved only slowly to 
reflect new realities in New Zealand's strategic position. 
Certainly it is only recently that notions of threat and 
warn1ng, and the connection to planning have been noted in 
defence white papers. The first occasion was the 1987 
whi te paper, which contained the fullest discussion 
available - in a public document at least - of threats to 
New Zealand and some rough indication of the time scales 
New Zealand would face in which to respond. The white 
paper felt that invasion was not a possibility "within the 
next ten years or indeed longer", and should this situation 
change there would be "substantial . warn1ng time" in which 
to prepare counter-measures. (21) 
1 
'i 
/I 
1,1 
WPPISACl 327 
55 
DONZ91 continued the warning time d i scu ss i o n and, for the 
first time, a definition was provided: 
Warning time estimates the l ikely notice the New 
Zealand Government would have of evolving t h reats to 
our interests or security. Both war n ing and 
lead-times help determine the level o f c a pability 
needed for tasks which ou r force-in-being must be able 
to carry out.(22) 
This definition follows the conventional NATO app roach to 
warning time: it is threat focused, linea r i n n ature and 
dependent upon accurate and timely 
Government of threats. In Chapter Two, 
percepti o n by the 
the l i mita tions of 
that approach were discussed, while in the nex t c ha pter the 
focus is on why it is not well suited to New Ze aland's 
particular circumstances. An alternative mode l is outlined. 
NEW ZEALAND·S EXPERIENCE WITH WARNING 
DONZ91 makes the interesting assertion that 
In no case (since World War II) could the dec is ion to 
deploy have been foreseen much mor e than a year 
beforehand. In most cases the not ice wa s considerably 
shorter.(23) 
It is difficult to speak with conf idence a bout how New 
Zealand should deal with strategic wa r ning i n the future 
unless one has some idea of what the past ha s been like. 
In Annex A this statement from DONZ91 i s t ested and 
developed by examining the historical detail of cases where 
New Zealand military forces we r e eithe r deployed 
operationally, or where their use was 
contemplated, during the period 1898 to 199 1. 
seriously 
The results 
of this survey are compared to two Australia n studies in an 
effort to test three propositions: 
... 
r 
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That lower level conflicts 
warnlng time relative to 
conflicts. 
have occurred wi th lesser 
medium and higher level 
• That warning time has been decreasing. 
• That, since World War II, warning has averaged less 
than one year. 
The key conclusions reached from this survey were that, 
firstly, the New Zealand experience has shown a strong 
correlation between the level (ie low, medium or high) of 
contingency and its warning time. Methodological 
differences between the study at Annex A and the two 
Australian studies prevented an adequate comparison between 
the three surveys. 
Secondly, the study of past New Zealand deployments points 
towards a general decrease in warning time since World War 
Two. This conclusion is supported by one of the Australian 
studies examined, and in part by the other. 
Finally, the contention that warning for New Zealand 
deployments has averaged less than 12 months since WWII is 
supported by the evidence at Annex A. Except for the 
Vietnam War, all other deployments gave warning times of 
less than twelve months; indeed, the average warning time 
for actual or possible deployments of New Zealand forces 
since WWII (including Vietnam) was only 5.8 months. Some 
implications of this data are suggested in Chapter Four. 
Ii c 
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THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF CURRENT NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY 
Current New Zealand strategic guidance strongly reflects 
the historical pattern in favour of collective approaches 
towards securi ty. DONZ91 takes the view that New Zealand 
faces no large direct threat, but instead must reconcile 
limited resources with the protection and promotion of wide 
interests. The white paper puts it this way: 
New Zealand defence policy has to cover both an 
extensive home environment where the threat is low but 
the tasks demanding and an even more diffuse need to 
support our economic and other interests at great 
distances.{24} 
There is nothing grandiose about the comment that New 
Zealand's interests are wide-spread it simply 
acknowledges the key driving force of New Zealand defence 
policy. The absence of a large direct threat removes the 
bench-mark most commonly used by other states to structure 
their forces; that is, to better one's perceived enemy. 
A number of other approaches are possible, such as the use 
of scenarios and net assessments, but the one adopted by 
DONZ91 is to key force structure to a series of eight 
defence tasks, derived from defence goals. These tasks, 
listed below, are used to provide order to activities and 
the purchase of equipment. 
New Zealand Defence Tasks 
• To protect the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of New Zealand, and those countries 
for which it has constitutional responsibilities 
• To provide defence advice 
• To provide intelligence 
• To maintain a force in reserve 
c 
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• To provide ancillary services 
• To contribute to regional security 
• To participate in defence alliances 
• To contribute to collective security 
DONZ9l argues that the strategy which best encapsulates 
these tasks is that of 'Self Reliance in Partnership': 
... to protect the sovereignty and advance the 
well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of 
armed forces sufficient to deal with small 
contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, 
and capable of contributing to collective efforts 
where our wider interests are involved.(25) 
Under current Government policy, the implications of such a 
strategy for the defence force are extremely broad. While 
the first priority for the defence force is the territorial 
integrity of New Zealand itself, very little military 
capability is structured for this purpose: other tasks 
command prior attention and determine capabilities. Add to 
that extremely limited resources, and these factors have 
resulted in an emphasis on general purpose capabilities 
able to work in a wide range of operating condi tions, and 
capable of adapting to an equally varied range of tasks. 
The rights and wrongs of such a strategy are not the direct 
concern of this paper. What does matter for present 
purposes 1S that the NZDF must structure for an extremely 
wide range of possible contingencies. The variables which 
other states use to guide force planning such as the 
capabilities of an enemy, operating conditions etc - are, 
l~ . 
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ln New 
change. 
Zealand's circumstances, imprecise and subject to 
This creates many difficulties, one of which is to 
make the conceptualisation of warning time in New Zealand's 
circumstances particularly difficult. On what threat, 
scenarlO or tasks should such a warning model be focused? 
And where or when? 
This creates the most obvious difference between how the 
concept of warning is applied in Australia, or how it used 
to be applied in NATO. Australian strategic thinking, for 
example, sees warning as an understanding of the time it 
would take for a regional actor to mount a military threat 
against Australia. NATO focused (in a slightly different 
way) on the time available to respond to a threat from 
Warsaw Pact forces. 
Those approaches have not been applied to New Zealand 
largely because there is an assumption that without a 
direct threat to New Zealand, they would not be useful. 
That assumption is tested in the following chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
There has been a clear policy desire, especially since the 
1970s, to establish in New Zealand military forces able to 
act more independently, especially for low level tasks ln 
the South Pacific. While acknowledging that that goal was 
narrowly conceived and was never meant to equate to 
self-sufficiency, achieving it has not been particularly 
successful in terms of capabilities, doctrine, planning, or 
consistency of political approach. 
It remains the case that New Zealand's armed forces are 
1 
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structured primarily for operating as part of larger allied 
formations, whether at sea, on land or in the air. The 
notion that New Zealand would only ever supply a 'large 
body of well trained men' for future conflicts has changed 
wi th the movement away from a non-regular army, but the 
principle remains: the NZDF is, by and large, an add-on, 
with very little ability to operate as an independent 
New Zealand force. 
There are many reasons for that, but one which this study 
seeks to highlight is the lack of a robust planning model 
wi th which to systematically link New Zealand's strategic 
circumstances to capability needs and priorities. Notions 
of warning have made little impact on long range strategic 
thinking. The discussion of warning time which first 
occurred in 1987 reflected the higher profile which the 
concept had gained through publication of the Dibb Review 
in Australia. But it was defined rather differently and 
little thought has been given to how the application of the 
concept in Australia might differ from its use in New 
Zealand. 
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Chapter Four 
A MODEL OF STRATEGIC WARNING TIME FOR NEW ZEALAND 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been established that existing approaches to warn1ng 
are not directly applicable to New Zealand's 
circumstances. Furthermore, 
exper1ence 1S that warn1ng 1S 
broad approaches are suggested 
New Zealand's 
likely to be 
to the 1ssues 
historical 
short. Two 
raised by 
these conclusions: firstly, New Zealand could accept that 
warn1ng will always be short and therefore the notion of 
warn1ng time as a planning concept should be treated as of 
only marginal value. From this perspective, we should 
concentrate on having a ready reaction capability able to 
respond to events which arise with little or no warning. 
The second broad approach, and that which is favoured by 
this paper, is to construct a warning time model for New 
Zealand that will provide defence planners with a flexible 
and forward looking tool as a necessary (though not 
sufficient) guide to important aspects of force planning in 
the NZDF. 
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IGNORE STRATEGIC WARNING TIME? 
One possible application of the warning time notion for New 
Zealand would be to rely on others' alert mechanisms as the 
means to initiate defence preparation in New Zealand. This 
would certainly be consistent with the approach taken 
historically. New Zealand has not had to respond more 
quickly to deployments in the past due to the simple fact 
that it was never New Zealand under threat. So long as 
others - who were also likely to be larger and more capable 
- were more vitally involved, then New Zealand would always 
have time to prepare for conflict. 
Historically this translated into armed forces maintained 
at low levels of readiness and with very little ability to 
mobilise quickly in response to unforeseen events. As we 
saw above, the most important requirement was that forces 
be structured in an 'expedi tionary' fashion sui table for 
absorption into larger allied formations. That any New 
Zealand contribution would also likely be small in nature 
and of limited (or no) military significance, made rapid 
commitment unecessary. New Zealand forces were, by and 
large, sent abroad for political purposes. It was the 
announcement of their commitment that had to be rapid, not 
their deployment. 
Reversing such dependence on others' judgements could be 
both expensive and difficult. Broadly speaking, warning 
can be improved by acquiring greater intelligence 
collection and assessment capabilities, or by seeking 
better linkages to other states through intelligence 
sharing arrangements. The costs of acquiring a larger 
independent capacity would be high, involving an expansIon 
d 
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of signals and communications intelligence activities 
(perhaps with bases beyond the New Zealand mainland), more 
frequent surveillance over a wider area by aircraft and 
ships, and the greater use of satellite technology. 
The cheaper alternative is to rely on other states for 
information regarding strategic developments. Indeed, this 
already is New Zealand's largest source of intelligence 
information, though it has been severely curtailed 
following the breakdown of the New Zealand-US leg of the 
AN Z USa 11 ian c e . ReI yin g 0 not he r s has its dis a d van tag e s 
however: information 
fashion, may not 
presented from 
strategic outlook. 
be 
the 
may not be received in a timely 
received at all, and is usually 
perspective of another country's 
A preferable approach would be to place the emphasis on 
response rather than enhanced warning. New Zealand could 
simply expect that warning will be negligible and 
acknowledge that the trade-off for this will be the 
heightened readiness of key capabilities. For tasks in the 
South Pacific and around New Zealand in particular (where 
New Zealand has a particular burden of responsibility) high 
readiness would become the accepted cost of not having a 
long term warning mechanism. This approach then, would 
marginalise the value of early warning as a defence 
planning concept and rely on other factors principally 
the need for higher readiness as determinants of force 
balance, readiness and procurement priority. 
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FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND STRATEGIC WARNING TIME MODEL 
That approach is rejected here. It would abdicate to 
others the political and operational responsibility for 
providing warning for the use of the NZDF. It would do 
nothing to encourage the development in New Zealand of a 
more rigorous basis from which to draw guidance for the 
NZDF. It would place New Zealand in an especially reactive 
position towards its strategic environment, unable to 
respond to, and influence events, at an early stage. By 
placing the onus on higher readiness to counter lack of 
sufficient warning, it would also be a more costly path to 
take. 
In a low threat security environment strategic warning time 
should be a planning tool able to inform force development 
over the longer term, not just operational reactions to 
one's strategic environment. In this section the framework 
for a model of warning time for New Zealand's unIque 
strategic circumstances is investigated. The extremely 
broad scope of New Zealand's strategic outlook and the wide 
range of tasks and possible commitments that this gIves 
rIse to was noted above. In order to provide discipline, 
then, the framework is developed in two broad parts based 
on the two distinct elements which make up New Zealand's 
strategic outlook. For reasons which are explained further 
below, those two elements can be called the 'partnership' 
and 'self reliance' components of the defence strategy of 
'Self Reliance in Partnership'. Wi thin those two parts, 
the following categorisation can be made: 
Part A: 'Partnership Tasks' 
• Contributions to alliances 
I ' 
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• Contributions to regional security 
• Contributions to collective security 
Part B: 'Self Reliance Tasks' 
• New Zealand's immediate strategic area: New Zea 1 and, 
Australia, and the Southwest Pacific 
Part A: Warning Time for 'Partnership' Tasks 
What sort of tasks would these categories imply for the 
NZDF and how would warning be used to guide force 
structure? In general terms, the partnership side of the 
equation is distinguished from those under self reliance by 
the degree to which New Zealand would play a subordinate 
role, both in military and political terms, and usually at 
some distance from New Zealand. Such tasks are likely to 
be highly selective and designed to meet political 
objectives by making an appropriate operational 
contribution. The following are illustrative: 
• Contributions to Alliances 
This category would involve contributions under the 
ANZUS Treaty. Australia is discussed in greater 
detail below, while the New Zealand-US leg of the 
alliance is inoperative. If it were not so, 
contingencies could conceivably include a wide range 
of commitments from low to high level conflict in the 
Asia Pacific region. 
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• Contributions to Regional Security 
Illustrative of contingencies under this category are 
contributions to the protection of Singapore or 
Malaysia under the Five Power Defence Arrangements 
(FPDA), or the provision of naval or air forces for 
the protection of sea lanes. Under some more extreme 
circumstances, ground forces could be committed ln 
support of allies or friends. The notion of 'region' 
could, most broadly, encompass the Asia Pacific 
generally, but for reasons of historical precedent, 
geographical proximity and because of residual defence 
links, the most likely location for involvement in the 
reglon would be Southeast Asia (Australia and the 
Southwest Pacific are covered in more detail below). 
• Contributions to Collective Security 
This category includes those 'partnership' 
contingencies which do not fall under the previous two 
sub-headings. For example, it takes in contributions 
to peace enforcement actions sanctioned by the United 
Nations or other coali tion-type actions, such as the 
Desert Storm operation against Iraq. It covers also 
the increasingly important and demanding peacekeeping 
tasks, although these are not directly covered by this 
paper. 
Implications for Warning and Force Planning 
From these 
implications 
three categories 
for warning and 
a number of 
force planning 
general 
can be 
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highlighted. As noted above, the sheer range of possible 
contingencies covered and New Zealand's lack of an adequate 
and independent intelligence collection capacity makes 
elaborating on warning requirements difficult. Relying on 
others may still leave enough preparation time, but it may 
also lead to delays and a slower response from New Zealand, 
made worse by the long transitting times imposed by 
geography. 
At odds with this is the fact that a high political value 
1S placed on prompt response in times of crisis in order to 
show resolve or to act as a deterrent. Timeliness of 
response is therefore politically and militarily important 
and, furthermore, warning appears to be declining. This 
places a premium on readiness over regeneration: 
governments want options now, not later. 
Acknowledging such 
approach for these 
contradictory factors, the 
three categories may be to 
preferred 
place the 
emphasis not on enhanced warning but on response. The 
construction of a more sophisticated warning time framework 
to aid rapid response would satisfy the need for timely 
reaction, but without calling for an over-elaborate warning 
mechanism. This suggests adapting the 'menu of options' 
framework that the united States has developed since 1991, 
which has seen a renewed emphasis on timely (normally short 
warning) response to a diffuse range of threats at great 
distance from its shores. This methodology has parallels 
for other states who also find themselves facing a low, but 
changeable, threat environment. 
The 'menu of options' approach would see the identification 
of a range of generic contingencies drawn from the three 
categories listed above. Against each contingency could be 
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mapped a series of alternative response options at varlOUS 
readiness levels. The objective would not only be to 
shorten decision making and preparation time, but also to 
provide more flexibility by recognising that different 
situations could require a range of combat or combat 
support responses. A more ambitious design would also 
factor in poli tical and economic responses. A key 
objective would be to satisfy not only operational demands, 
but also the political need for rapid response as a symbol 
of commitment to collective action. 
The following hypothetical examples illustrate how this 
might work in practice: 
Example A: Contributing towards a 
action with a coalition of partners. 
could include: 
battalion of infantry 
company of engineers 
peace enforcement 
Response options 
troop of armoured reconnaissance vehicles 
squadron of A4 Skyhawks 
squadron of transport aircraft 
frigate 
supply ship 
Example B: Assisting in the protection of sea lanes 
may have the following response options to select from: 
frigate/s 
supply ship 
P3 Orions 
A4 Skyhawks 
\ 
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Against each option would be marked required lead and 
preparation times, updated regularly to allow for 
maintenance periods, deployments on exercise and so on. 
Such a menu would give decision makers a prepared series of 
options calibrated to actual crises. This process would 
have the advantage of linking specific capabilities to 
specific contingencies, providing an important indicator 
for readiness levels and force balance. 
From the perspective 
politicians would be 
of decision making, 
able to respond more 
commanders and 
quickly from a 
pre-arranged format and would have more flexibility in the 
type and timing of response. In particular, decision 
makers would have more options regarding how soon they 
responded and at what level. They would have better 
information on the limitations of some options, 
developed plans for what might be available 
commitment be upgraded in the future. 
as well as 
should a 
Part B: Warning for New Zealand's Immediate Strategic Area 
Concentrating on a more sophisticated 
has some advantages, but also runs 
response mechanism 
the danger of 
unnecessary costs through 
trends, which could have 
nature and level of 
excessIve readiness. Long range 
fundamental implications for the 
forces, may also be neglected. 
Focussing on response also reduces the model to a purely 
operational construct, ignoring the guidance it can provide 
to capability priorities, expansion requirements, 
procurement cycles and so on. In short, the approach 
recommended under Part A would not on its own provide the 
basis for long-term force structuring. 
I 
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One methodology which overcomes some of these limi tations 
has been well developed in the Australian context. As seen 
above, where a warning model has been created focussing on 
the geography of the area to be defended, its air and sea 
approaches, and the nature of regional military 
capabilities (extant and potential). Together with the 
concepts of credible contingencies and expansion base, the 
notions of warning and preparation time provide the basic 
determinants for Australian force planning and strategy.(l} 
Assuming New Zealand's current 
Australian approach could not be 
strategic guidance, the 
transplanted directly to 
New Zealand: to structure for a direct threat to New 
Zealand would not guide the development of forces needed 
for wider (and more important) tasks. However, there are a 
number of reasons why the Australian methodology could work 
when applied to a wider geographical area which we might 
call New Zealand's 'immediate strategic area', encompassing 
the area in and around New Zealand, the Southwest Pacific 
and Australia, including its northern approaches: 
• This area matters most for the immediate physical 
securi ty of New Zealand and its dependencies, for its 
sea lanes, and for the securi ty of its closest ally 
and South Pacific friends. A threat to or through any 
part of this area would be a threat to New Zealand. 
• It is in this part of the world that New Zealand could 
expect to playa significant military role. For those 
tasks where New Zealand seeks to act alone, or with a 
large measure of independence, planning must be most 
comprehensive. Dependence upon others to provide 
warning would not be acceptable for political reasons 
(it would compromise New Zealand's sovereignty) or 
WPPISACI 327 
73 
operationally (there might be delays or even a 
complete absence of accurate information). There is a 
distinct requirement then to focus what limited 
independent surveillance and intelligence capabilities 
New Zealand has on its immediate strategic area. 
• The area, although still huge by any standards, would 
provide far more specific guidance in terms of 
deployment times, operating conditions, capabilities 
of regional states, and so forth. 
What would sort of contingencies or tasks would be used to 
guide planning? As indicated above, these are taken to be 
those tasks where New Zealand could expect to play a more 
prominent role and where it would have to rely to a very 
large degree on its own resources from warn1ng 
information, to response and sustainment. DONZ91 has 
defined the self reliance component of New Zealand's 
defence strategy as "an independent capabi Ii ty to deploy a 
national force to carry out low-level tasks in and around 
New Zealand waters and in the South Pacific." (2) In this 
paper Australia has also been included on the grounds that 
the strategic interests of New Zealand and Australia 
overlap widely, and that a threat to one would generally be 
recognised as constituting a threat to the other. It 1S 
worth observing however, that 'credible contingencies', as 
they are defined by Australian strategic guidance, include 
'escalated low level' contingencies, which would be 
somewhat more demanding than the low level contingencies 
for e see n inDO N Z 9 1 . (3) I 11 u s t rat i ve 0 f t he act u a 1 t ask s 
under self reliance are the following: 
In and around New Zealand: 
Counter-terrorism 
EEZ patrol and enforcement 
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Australia: 
Defence of Australia type 'credible 
contingencies' eg defending against covert 
mining, air attacks on northern settlements and 
lodgements of forces on Australian territory 
Southwest Pacific: 
Evacuation of nationals 
Assistance to Island governments 
Framework of the Warning Model for New Zealand's Immediate 
Strategic Area 
In the space available here only a broad outline of a 
warnlng model is sketched, but it would have to contain the 
following features: 
• Formal 
warnlng 
interest 
identification and categorisation of early 
indicators (EWI) for the area of strategic 
that would give a timely signal of a 
deterioration in the strategic environment. 
• Assessments of the likely time frames available to the 
defence force before the emergence of threats to New 
Zealand or its interests. 
• Identification of required lead times and preparation 
times to enable reaction to occur within warning. 
• Establishment of a menu of options to enable timely 
and flexible response in an operational sense. 
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• Provision of a mechanism to allow response in terms of 
long range strategic planning. This would mean the 
integration of the concept within the defence planning 
system as a key driver of force development. 
As an illustration of these features, take the following 
hypothetical example: 
Example: Emergence of New External Presence in the 
South Pacific. 
The following strategic EWI might be plotted to . gIve 
early warning of this development: 
increased 
Countries 
political 
(PICs), 
contact 
including 
diplomatic representation 
with Pacific 
establishment 
Island 
of 
increased trade and aid contacts and the conclusion 
of agreements 
increased personal contact with PIC leadership elite 
increased frequency, duration and/or range of 
military deployments in the region 
use of PIC facilities by external power for 
re-supply, transit or forward basing of military forces 
signing of defence agreements or treaty 
provision by external power of military advisors 
and aid to PIC disciplined forces 
build-up of PIC disciplined forces with support of 
external power 
increasing influence over domestic politics of PIC 
by external power 
combination of the above wi th exclusion of PIC's 
traditional political, security and trading partners 
encouragement of terrorism and political extremism 
II 
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In other PICs 
political support for opposition forces in other 
PICs 
military support for anti-government rebels ln a 
PIC state 
The above list IS 
hypothetical (and 
not exhaustive and covers 
extreme) example. It does 
broadly however, the sort of EWI which would 
indicate a deteriorating strategic environment. 
only one 
illustrate 
be seen to 
At each point there would be a need to assess the 
requirement 
earlier EWI 
EWI might 
for immedi ate oper at iona I responses. The 
may requIre only diplomatic reaction. Later 
requl re changes to the NZDF' s deployment 
activities and the defence mutual assistance programme ln 
the region, as well as forward planning on what direction 
the presence of a new (and possibly unwelcome) external 
actor will take in the region. In order to respond to the 
later EWI, lead and preparation times would be important 
considerations: if a larger submarine threat is envisaged 
for example, can present aircraft and crew numbers sustain 
more frequent patrolling? How long does a new aircraft 
take to acquire and integrate into the force structure? 
And what about its crew? These are the sorts of issues on 
which detailed knowledge is required in order for 
commanders to satisfy themselves that they have the 
capacity to respond to tasks within anticipated warnlng 
times. 
The most important force structure guidance to be gained is 
an indication of any required change to readiness levels 
wi thin the defence force and of the balance between the 
(I 
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force in being and the reserve. In the extreme case that 
New Zealand had to deploy its Ready Reaction Force to the 
South Pacific or to northern Australia, for example, the 
function of a warning model would be to give early notice 
of that possibility, leading to a reassessment of the 
batta 1 ion's readiness st ates, its susta inment capaci ty and 
the requirements for expansion of the Army should that be 
required. 
If the model is sophisticated enough, it should capture 
also the generic characteristics described above: that lS, 
it must be multi-tracked in the sense that it can 
accommodate a number of strategic developments at once. 
The process must also allow the in-put of non-military 
responses to meet a deteriorating situation and should be 
flexible enough to acknowledge an improvement, if there lS 
one, ln a situation that had initially been deteriorating. 
It must also have reaction options able to cope with 
surprise. 
Finally, the model must be capable of reversal: planners 
must not automatically assume that identification of a 
deteriorating strategic environment will lead inexorably to 
conflict. The early identification of negative EWI should 
offer an opportunity to respond in a timely manner in order 
to improve the strategic environment, thus alleviating the 
need for larger military commitments later in time. The 
process should thus be premised on the possibility of 
'reversal' and this should be one of the goals of the model. 
Summary of a Complete Model 
To recap: a model of warning time for New Zealand would be 
composed of two parts. Part A would focus on New Zealand's 
Id 
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wider interests and tasks. It would apply warning time 
where possible, but the emphasis would be on reaction 
specifically, the construction of a pre-programmed 'menu of 
options' to shorten reaction time, to give greater 
flexibility, and to ensure that lead and preparation times 
have a clear connection to expected levels of warning In 
the selected areas where New Zealand considers that it can 
make a contribution. 
Part B, focusing on New Zealand's immediate strategic area, 
would be more complex and would provide important 
information for determining large elements of force 
structure. Readiness levels, force balance and information 
for weighting capability procurement would be obtained 
through focussing on the geography of the area, regional 
capabilities, likely tasks and a detailed understanding of 
lead and preparation times. These elements, which contain 
a strong element of continuity, would provide the most 
reliable data for informing the acquisition of capabilities. 
The interaction between the two halves of the model would 
requIre careful consideration, especially relating to the 
relative priority to assign between them. Other factors, 
primarily political, would determine that balance. A 
likely result could be that while Part B of the model would 
provide warning guidance for a large proportion of the 
force structure, some additional capability in selected 
areas would be needed to accommodate the demands made by 
partnership tasks under Part A of the model. 
Some General Implications for Force Development 
In the absence of 
suggesting explicit 
a complete 
guidelines for 
and functioning model, 
force development will 
II· 
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be avoided by this paper. However, some indications of the 
general effect that such a model would have on the NZDF are 
possible. 
The most important impact on capability procurement 
priorities would be a greater emphasis on independent 
intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Emphasis would 
also be placed on links with allies and friends in order to 
widen sources since even an enhanced New Zealand capability 
would still have limited reach and capacity. 
The effect on other capabilities, assuming the present 
strategic environment, would probably be an emphasis on 
meeting low level threats which might arise at short 
notice. With shorter warning times and a political 
imperative for timely response, readiness is seen to be 
important, even for small threats. 
The corollary of this is that the expansion base would be 
de-emphasised in the absence of medium or high level 
threats. Two key dangers present themselves in this 
respect: firstly, even low level contingencies have the 
potential to be extremely demanding and may requ1re 
expanS10n 1n order to be deal t wi th. Secondly, for even 
low level tasks, the defence force will still requ1re a 
certain degree of sustainment. In trading off expansion 
for readiness - perhaps justifiable in a benign environment 
care must be taken, especially with a small defence 
force, such as New Zealand's, to preserve the ability of 
the force to sustain itself for even low level tasks. 
CAVEATS AND DANGERS 
Some might 
Slnce the 
argue that Part A of 
contingencies likely 
the model 
to ar1se 
1S superfluous 
under these 
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headings can be satisfied with capabilities retained for 
tasks in New Zealand's immediate strategic area. That 
argument does not follow from the model of warning time 
outlined here. (4) The emphasis which the model places on 
New Zealand's area of immediate strategic concern is for 
the purposes of strategic assessment and defence force 
structuring; it says little about defence force 
activities. The preferred balance of activities between, 
on the one hand, the immedi ate st r ategic a rea and, on the 
other, the area beyond is not suggested by this model. 
In any case, the model also takes in wider contingencies 
and commi tments under the headings of regional, alliance 
and collective security. The inclusion of partnership 
tasks may well make additional demands on the force 
structure beyond that required for New Zealand's immediate 
strategic area. 
In short, the model is for warning time alone; it IS a 
planning mechanism and does not purport to be a basis for 
wider strategy. It does not, for example, advocate 'the 
defence of New Zealand's immediate strategic area' to be a 
defence strategy for New Zealand. That approach would not 
meet wider obligations and political interests as they are 
defined by present strategic guidance. 
A second concern is more sustainable: considering the 
large impact that contingencies in the Australian north 
could have on the NZDF, especially the Army, it IS 
questionable whether New Zealand would want to hold itself 
hostage to Australian strategic guidance. Should the 
current bi-partisan agreement in Australia over defence 
policy breakdown, or should it markedly change, New Zealand 
would have to reassess its own stance. 
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This paper has advocated the development of a more robust 
warning time model for New Zealand to contribute towards a 
more uniquely New Zealand strategic basis for force 
development. It would be ironic if the course of action 
recommended by this paper were to transfer operational and 
political dependency from one (former) ally to another. 
One way of overcoming this difficulty may be for New 
Zealand to commit itself to only some very specific tasks 
in the defence of Australia's north - tasks which are not 
likely to change regardless of what party is in government 
and which would not result in the wholesale commitment of 
the NZDF to Australian objectives.(5) In any case, a 
number of tasks are already ruled out since, as noted 
above, Australian strategic guidance plans for 
contingencies up to 'escalated low levels' in its far 
north, 
DONZ91 
and this is a step up from the 
(which calls for the NZDF to be 
guidance glven ln 
able to cope wi th 
self reliance tasks at low levels only). 
COMPARISON TO PRESENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 
As noted 
time as 
ln the preVlOUS 
estimate of 
chapter, DONZ 91 def ined warnlng 
an the likely notice that the 
Government would have of evolving threats to New Zealand's 
interests security. Such definition . useful for or a lS 
applying to an examination of the historical record (as lS 
done ln Annex A) , but as a basis for planning it leads to 
all of the difficulties associated with the British Ten 
Year Rule of the 1920s; that is, it is a static concept 
which is not intended to drive force structure in response 
to changes in the strategic environment. 
II 
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The model advocated above would differ in an important 
respect: whereas current guidance focuses on the 
Government as the trigger mechanism for responding to 
warnlng, this model would respond to warning indicators at 
a much earlier stage. The difference is an important one 
as the objective of having a defence planning system keyed 
to changes in the strategic environment is to prevent 
threats arising, rather than to react once threats have 
emerged. The model would provide decision makers with more 
timely information and in a systematic fashion. That ln 
itself would allow greater flexibility in response and more 
opportunity to influence events. A warning system that 
simply relies on acknowledgement, acceptance and response 
from government is too static. It will be far more easily 
surprised and will not likely leave sufficient time to take 
account of long lead times for larger capabilities, or for 
preparation in times of crisis. 
The other main difference is one largely of emphasis. The 
model proposed in this paper would assume a far greater 
role in the defence planning system than the notion of 
warning time currently receives. But for it to do so, more 
detail would be required and it would need wide acceptance 
within defence and government thinking. 
CONCLUSION: AGENDA FOR FURTHER WORK 
In this paper we have focused on the rationale and 
methodology of a strategic warning time model for New 
Zealand. The example used above illustrates the further 
work that would be required in order for the model to 
function as an integral part of the defence planning 
jI 
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system. A detailed physical knowledge of the area of 
strategic interest would need to be combined with an 
equally complete picture of regional military 
capabilities. Analysts would need to settle on what they 
consider to be the contingencies or tasks most likely to be 
undertaken (what the Australians have called 'credible 
contingencies', but which New Zealand has preferred to call 
'tasks') both within the area of immediate strategic 
interest and under the 'partnership' categories outlined 
above. The construction of EWI for contingencies and tasks 
would also be demanding. 
A strategic assessment of time frames avai lable for, say, 
contingencies in the north of Australia or the South 
Pacific would be particular ly contentious. On this point, 
it would be best to avoid definitive assessments, such as a 
'ten year rule' . It may be preferable to class future 
events according to an order of magnitude - say short term 
(within three years); medium term (3-8 years); and long 
term (beyond eight years), always remembering that such 
figures can never be predictions of threats, but estimates 
of the amount of warning available before a response might 
be required. 
Other work includes a comprehensive assessment of necessary 
lead and preparation times and a comparison of them wi th 
likely warning, according to the tasks and contingencies 
identified. There is a large question, not covered by this 
paper, as to what extent and in what areas lead times have 
expanded or contracted, and the implications of this for 
warning and preparation. If lead and preparation times 
exceed of expected warning, some serious questions must be 
asked about preparedness. 
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In terms of response, putting together a menu of options 
for operational response would seem a sensible way to speed 
up reaction and give decision makers greater flexibility. 
(Such an approach would also have applicability in the 
peacekeeping field.) 
Response over the longer term would occur through the 
defence planning system. The integration of the warning 
model into the system would be essential to its value. The 
output which it provides should be seen as an important 
(though not the only) driver of force structure changes, 
acting as a trigger mechanism for readiness levels and 
force expansion. 
Footnotes 
1 Dibb (1992), op cit, Chapter 1. 
2 DONZ91, op cit, P 53. 
3 For further discussion of this type of approach, see 
Stewart Woodman, "A Question of Priorities: 
Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 
1990s", SDSC Working Paper No 260 (1992), pp 15-16. 
4 A simi lar point is made in DONZ91, op ci t, p 53: "A 
force structured for interoperability with Australia 
and our other allies will also be able to handle most 
South Pacific tasks. This is not true in reverse." 
5 For a fuller discussion of this subject see Woodman 
(1992), op cit. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has argued that strategic warning time 1S a 
valuable defence planning tool for guiding the structure of 
defence forces in New Zea land. The problem of having no 
threat - of 'not knowing', as Colin Powell described it -
could be overcome by establishing a detailed and systematic 
strategic warning system to link developments in the 
strategic environment to force structure changes. From 
such a model, important information affecting readiness 
levels and the balance of forces could be gained. Data 
affecting priorities for capability procurement and 
developments in doctrine could also be systematically 
collated. This methodology would ensure that reaction 1S 
within expected warning, and would provide greater 
certainty to judgements about the strategic environment and 
the status of the Defence Force. 
The evidence shows that the amount of warning time 
available to New Zealand has historically been short: an 
average of 9.7 months since 1898, while since 1945 that has 
reduced to 5.8 months. Since 1975, the average warn1ng 
time has been just 4 days. We could not apply such data in 
a predictive manner, but it can be used to corroborate a 
number of trends which hi therto were supported, in the New 
Zealand setting at least, only by anecdotal evidence. 
Firstly, anticipating the operational use of military force 
1S notoriously difficult and decisions to deploy forces 
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will frequently be taken at a very late stage 1n any 
crisis. Secondly, low level conflicts, which have been the 
most frequent type for New Zealand, have given much less 
warn1ng relative to medium and higher level conflicts. 
Finally, warning time has decreased markedly in recent 
years. 
This creates an important dilemma for defence planners: 
while warning is measured in months, the life-cycle of 
maJor force structure components, such as equipment and the 
specialised training of personnel, is measured in decades. 
There are many risks to be run and choices to be made in 
cop1ng with this problem of extended time-frame versus 
uncertainty. A number of mechanisms could be applied 1n 
order to guide our choices and lessen the risks, of which 
the notion of strategic warning time is one. 
Warning time was developed and extensively applied by NATO 
forces during the Cold War, largely as a mechanism wi th 
which to initiate operational alert against a specific 
enemy. It was conceived in a very straight forward 
fashion: threats triggered warning indicators which 
triggered responses. But the end of the Cold War removed 
an overarching threat to Western Europe, as well as the 
imperative for split-second reaction. The united States, 
amongst others, has had to re-think its approach to 
strategic warning in an environment where threats are more 
diffuse and of a lower order. 
In Australia, the absence of defined threat has produced a 
very different conceptualisation of warning time. By 
focusing on the geography of the area to be defended and 
regional military capabilities, the notion of warning time 
1S used to help determine readiness levels and force 
w: 
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expans10n requirements. In this sense, warning time 1S an 
important guide to planning over the longer term. 
New Zealand's strategic circumstances present un1que 
difficulties for the application of warning time.New 
Zealand faces no direct threat, and this removes a key 
guide for gauging the size, type and role of its military 
forces. Furthermore, the emphasis that has been placed 
historically on structuring forces to suit the needs of 
allies has retarded the development of a force able to 
conduct joint operations independently. It has also 
reduced the need for an independent planning system which 
links strategic developments to the procurement of 
equipment and the structure of forces. 
In particular, New Zealand has given little thought to how 
the notion of strategic warning time might be applied. 
Clearly, in the absence of a direct threat, the use of the 
concept as it was developed by NATO is of limited relevance 
to New Zealand. However, there are lessons for New Zealand 
1n the way that the Uni ted States has sought to redefine 
notions of warning and response in the post-Cold War era. 
New Zealand too should consider placing more emphasis on 
timely, flexible reaction through the preparation of a 
'menu of options' to respond to short-warning crises. 
The Australian approach would seem to have more relevance 
to New Zealand's circumstances since the strategic outlook 
of the two countries has many similarities. But it could 
not be applied directly since, for New Zealand, the defence 
of home territory is a secondary priority after the 
protection and advancement of wider interests. 
New Zealand's unique strategic 
different approach to cope wi th 
circumstances 
the competing 
requ1re a 
demands of 
I" 
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short warning and long lead times. The construction of a 
detailed and coherent strategic warning time model would be 
an important step in the right direction. Such a model 
would be composed of two parts. Part A would cover New 
Zealand's wider interests and tasks - or what we might call 
the 'partnership' side of New Zealand's defence strategy of 
'Self Reliance in Partnership'. Because we could not 
expect to have detailed and timely intelligence on such a 
wide area, the emphasis here would be on reaction; having 
flexible and pre-planned options from which to choose at 
short notice in order to reduce reaction time and exercise 
more control over a situation. 
Part B of the model would focus on New Zealand's immediate 
strategic area - the Southwest Pacific, Australia and New 
Zealand. By systematically examining those aspects of the 
region which contain a large element of continui ty - such 
as geography and regional capabilities and through a 
detailed understanding of lead and preparation times, a 
better appreciation of likely warning time for deployments 
could be gained. Furthermore, by more closely aligning 
readiness levels and force balance to developments in the 
strategic environment, lead and preparation times are more 
likely to be within expected warnlng. 
This model would not necessarily form the basis for wider 
strategy and nor could it be used as a guide to actual 
deployments. I ts purpose is to provide an element of a 
defence planning methodology applicable to New Zealand's 
unique circumstances. The objective of such an approach is 
not merely to avoid a surprise attack, but to ensure the 
efficient and timely preparedness of New Zealand's national 
defence capability in response to an evolving security 
environment. 
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Annex A 
NEW ZEALAND'S PAST EXPERIENCE: 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF WARNING TIME 
The armourers accomplishing the knights, 
With busy hammers closing rivets up, 
Give dreadful note of preparation. 
Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act IV, Prologue. 
The detection of 'dreadful notes of preparation' is one of 
the primary aims for any system of warning. But in modern 
times those 'notes' are far more complex and 
than they were in the time of Henry V. Indeed, 
changeable 
looking at 
this problem from New Zealand's perspective, DONZ91 asserts 
that: 
In no case (since World War II) could the decision to 
deploy have been foreseen much more than a year 
beforehand. In most cases the notice was considerably 
shorter.{l) 
This statement is tested and developed in this annex by 
examining the historical detail of cases where New Zealand 
military forces 
where their use 
period 1898 to 
were either deployed operationally, 
was seriously contemplated, during 
1991. The results of this survey 
or 
the 
are 
1I 
II, 
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compared to two Australian studies in an effort to test 
three propositions: 
• That lower level conflicts 
warnIng time relative to 
conflicts. 
have occurred with 
medium and higher 
• That warning time has been decreasing. 
less 
level 
• That, since World War II, warning has averaged less 
than one year. 
It is not the aim here to estimate warning times for future 
threats to New Zealand or its interests. 
Scope of the Analysis 
In order to provide as wide a sample of case studies as 
possible, the historical period covered is extended back to 
1898 and widened to include si tuations where the use of 
force was seriously considered. The category of 'possible' 
deployments is considered in the analysis since this 
provides just as much information on the subject of warning 
time as actua 1 dep loyments . That is, it does not actua lly 
matter for the purposes of the survey which follows whether 
or not deployment occurred I but tha tit a lmost did, and 
therefore a process of warning, response and preparation 
was initiated. 
It should be noted however, that with only 22 case studies, 
the sample remains statistically small. This places some 
limits on the degree of confidence which we can have about 
conclusions reached from the data. One way of overcomIng 
w ~ 
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this difficulty is to compare the results of the New 
Zealand survey to other studies, and this is done below. 
An argument for including peacekeeping could be made. It 
would certainly widen the number of case studies examined 
and would account for an activity that, especially In 
recent years, has come to consume a large proportion of the 
New Zealand Defence Force's operating budget. However, 
detail on peacekeeping deployments is harder to come by: 
little information has been brought into the public arena 
and academic writing is negligible. Furthermore, 
peacekeeping is not a force determinant (ie the NZDF is not 
structured or funded primarily for this task). If one IS 
seeking to draw conclusions about force structure from an 
analysis of warning times, then peacekeeping should be 
treated separately from 'conventional' deployments. 
As an aside, though beyond the present study, an analysis 
of warning times for peacekeeping would be of value In 
light of the growing importance of peacekeeping and the 
likelihood of the NZDF's continued high level of 
involvement. It will become even more necessary as the 
line between 'conventional' deployments and Uni ted Nations 
sanctioned operations (such as peace enforcement) becomes 
more blurred. 
Validity of Historical Research 
Some may argue that the lessons derived from the earlier 
case studies (perhaps prior to World War II) are of little 
use to defence planners today. On balance it would seem 
sensible to treat the past with the caution that it 
deserves: as evidence of how things once happened under 
certain conditions, but not as a predictive mechanism for 
fl' 
" 
I 
.. 
WPPISACl 327 
92 
the future. The real value of the data presented below is 
that it can be used to indicate trends and to corroborate 
more casual interpretations of past events. 
Methodology 
The cases used are outlined briefly at Appendix 1. A 
comprehensive discussion of the historical circumstances IS 
not the objective, but rather determining the beginning and 
end points for warning time for the deployment concerned. 
For the purposes of this historical survey the definition 
of warning time used is that put forward by Cheeseman and 
Speedy: that is, warning time is "the time taken from 
government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it 
is judged an operational response will be required".(2) 
PRESENTATION OF NEW ZEALAND DATA 
Warning Periods and Conflict Levels 
The conflicts outlined in Appendix 1 can be ordered 
according to three broad levels to determine if there IS a 
correlation between the 'size' of a conflict and its 
warnIng time. Conflicts can be assigned to 'levels' 
according to criteria such as types of weaponry and tactics 
employed, the objectives of the parties involved, degree of 
mobilisation, and the level of resources involved. (3) 
I 
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The following breakdown was applied: 
• Low Level Conflicts: (14) 
Fashoda (1898) 
Fiji (1920) 
Iraq (1920) 
Niue (1921) 
Ocean Island (1925) 
Samoa (1928) 
Samoa (1929-30) 
Malaya (1948-60) 
Thailand (1962) 
Confrontation (1963-66) 
Fiji (May 1987) 
Fiji (September 1987) 
Vanuatu (1988) 
Bougainville (1990) 
• Medium Level Conflicts: (6) 
Boer War (1899-1902) 
Chanak (1922) 
Korean War (1950-53) 
Vietnam War (1964-75) 
Falklands War (1982) 
Gulf War (1990-91) 
• High Level Conflicts: (2) 
World War I (1914-18) 
World War II (1939-45) 
I 
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Averages of Warning Time (WT) were as follows: 
All Conflicts: WT Average = 9.71 months 
Low Level Conflict: WT Average = 55.64 days (1.85 
months) 
Medium Level Conflict: WT Average = 7.48 months 
High Level Conflict: WT Average = 5 years, 11.5 months 
The historical pattern shown here indicates that, for New 
Zealand, lower level conflicts have been both more frequent 
(64 percent of the sample) and have arisen wi th much less 
warnlng than medium 
months. High level 
only two since 1898, 
strategic warnlng. 
Shorter Warning Times? 
level conflicts, averaging only 1.85 
conflicts, of which there have been 
have afforded prolonged periods of 
It is common to hear and read of the growing speed, 
readiness and integration of weapons systems and entire 
national military capabilities. Does this mean that 
strategic warning is actually decreasing? We might test 
this proposition for New Zealand by examining average 
warning times since, say, 1945 (the end of WWrI) and 1975 
(the end of the war in Vietnam). Below are figures broken 
down overall and then according to conflict level. 
• All Conflicts 
Average 1898-91: 9.71 months 
Average 1945-91: 5.8 months 
Average 1975-91: 4 days (0.14 months) 
~i 
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• Low Level Conflicts 
Average 1898-91: 55.64 days (1.85 months) 
Average 1945-91: 93.7 days (3.12 months) 
Average 1975-91: 5.25 days (0.18 months) 
• Medium Level Conflicts 
• 
Average 1898-91: 
Average 1945-91: 
Average 1975-91: 
7.48 months 
10.5 months 
0.2 days 
High Level Conflicts 
Average 1898-91: 5 years, 11.5 months 
Average 1945-91: na 
Average 1975-91: na 
When all conflicts are considered together, warning time 
does appear to be decreasing. But that is a rather crude 
assessment since the only high level conflicts (which both 
afforded long stretches of warning) occurred within the 
first time period. Once the data is broken down by 
conflict level the results are less clear-cut, but still 
seem to indicate reduced warning, especially since 1975. 
Geographical Distribution 
It is also worth noting the geographical distribution of 
the deployments surveyed: 16 of the 22 (or 73%) occurred, 
in part or whole, in the Asia Pacific region, including the 
two World Wars. Fifty percent of the deployments occurred, 
in part or whole, in the Southwest Pacific. Aside from the 
two World Wars, they were all low level conflicts, almost 
all of which afforded no warning time at all. 
~··I " ,I 
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AUSTRALIAN STUDIES OF STRATEGIC WARNING 
The limits that can be placed on conclusions derived from 
such data (due to the small size of the sample) have been 
emphasised above. Furthermore, the contingencies to which 
New Zealand responded in the past may not necessarily be 
representative of situations which may be faced in the 
future. 
One way of helping to overcome such limits is to consider 
comparative data from other countries. Such work is not 
widely avai lable, at least in the public arena. However I 
two Australian studies do provide some basis for comparlson. 
Speedy Study 
A paper by Commander I M Speedy invest igated warning and 
perception times for 15 conflicts between 1939 and 
1973.(4) He concluded that the average time taken from the 
first indication of impending war to the firing of the 
first shot was 14.3 months. Since 1950 I that average has 
decreased to 10.6 months. Furthermore, there was a 50 
percent probability that conflict could occur in less than 
four months. 
Speedy's figures are for perception and warning time 
combined. He does not elaborate on the distinction between 
the two notions, but reviewing his figures for warning time 
only, they show that warning since World War II has 
averaged 5.5 months and since 1950 it has been 4.0 months. 
Breaking Speedy's examples down by conflict level gave the 
following results: 
~~, 
r I 
WI 
WPPISAC1 327 
97 
• For perception and warning time combined: 
All Conflicts: Average = 14.3 months 
Low Level Conflict: Average = 14.17 months 
Medium Level Conflict: Average = 10.94 months 
High Level Conflict: Average = 51 months 
• For warning time only: 
All conflicts: Average = 5.5 months 
Low Level Conflict: Average = 8.05 months 
Medium Level Conflict: Average = 4.2 months 
High Level Conflict: Average = 12 months 
We should note however, that Speedy included only one high 
level conflict (WWII) and three low level conflicts in his 
selection, which raises obvious questions about the 
treatment of data according to conflict level. This point 
will be returned to below. 
Central Studies Establishment Paper 
A 1986 study by the Australian Department of Defence's 
Central Studies Establishment (CSE) examined 37 conflicts 
or crlses between 1939 and 1973. (5) The study sought to 
establish a threat recognition model by analysing the 
process of perception and reaction to threats by 
governments. Three phases were identified as making up the 
period of 'warning' prior to conflict: 
perceived threat, and specific threat.(6) 
notional threat, 
The phases of 'perceived threat' and 'specific threat' 
which, when combined, equate most closely with warning time 
~!f 
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as it was defined above, averaged at 14.75 months between 
1939 and 1973. 
showed zero 
Almost one quarter of the examples surveyed 
warnlng of specific threat (ie the 
identification of a specific hostile intent and the 
capability to carry it out). Thirty-five percent of the 
examples showed warning of five weeks or less in the 
specific threat phase. 
As to whether this particular study shows a decline ln 
available warning time, the message is a mixed one. 
Warning available in the perceived and specific threat 
phases actually increased after the vietnam War: 13.6 
months prior to 1975 compared to 19.1 months since then. 
However, when the notional threat phase is factored ln, a 
significant decrease in warning is registered overall: an 
average of 52.1 months up to and including the vietnam War, 
compared to an average of 23.3 months warning for conflict 
since then. 
The CSE study also 
conflicts. Only 
(Confrontation) and 
focused predominantly on medium level 
one low level conflict was included 
one high level conflict (WWII), though 
each was 
break-down 
examined from 
by conflict 
three different perspectives . A 
level and by phase gives the 
following results: 
Low Level 
Medium Level 
High Level 
Average WT (months) 
N 
192.00 
96.16 
348.33 
p 
10.67 
34.45 
82.98 
s 
15.00 
17.68 
37 00 
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Low Level 
Medium Level 
High Level 
Key 
N = notional threat 
P = perceived threat 
S = specific threat 
99 
Average WT (months) 
N+P+S 
218.00 
148.29 
468.31 
P+S 
25.66 
19.87 
119.98 
Conclusion: Comparing the Data 
S 
15 . 00 
17 . 68 
37.00 
Clearly there are differences in the results of each 
study. In explaining why that is, the first differen c e to 
note is in the treatment of definitions for warning: the 
CSE study uses three phases in an examination of no t only 
warning as given by the Cheeseman and Speedy def ini tion 
above, but also of the time taken for threat percept ions to 
crystalise. Obviously the time frame over whi ch this 
occurs 1S much longer. The combined times fo r perceived 
and specific threats would seem to correlate mo s t closely 
(but not exactly) to the definition of warning time adopted 
above. 
~~, 
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Speedy's definition for warning time ("the first indication 
of war until the first shots are fired") is different 
agaln. The beginning point is ambiguous and he does not 
explain how it is established, or by whom. The definition 
used for collating the New Zealand data defines the end of 
warnlng as being the order to prepare an operational 
response. From then on, activity might be characterised by 
the term 'preparation time'. Speedy, however, sees the end 
point of warning as the firing of shots thus warnlng 
includes preparation time in his model. 
A further important difference was alluded to above: the 
conflicts surveyed by the Australian studies contain a 
disproportionately high number of medium level conflicts. 
(Obviously the number of high level conflicts could only be 
increased marginally by adding WWI). Analysis of warnlng 
time by conflict level cannot therefore be undertaken with 
any confidence with these studies. 
A second effect of including 
medium level conflicts may 
average warnlng time overall 
Zealand data described above, 
a disproportionate number of 
have been to lengthen the 
s lnce, as seen f rom the New 
low level conflicts are more 
likely to have shorter warning time. 
Given these caveats on methodology and differences in raw 
data, can any general conclusions be drawn between the 
studies? As to the apparent correlation between the 'size' 
of a conflict and its warning time (which was supported by 
the New Zealand data), little can be added owing to the 
limited number of low level conflicts which both the Speedy 
and CSE study examined. 
Do the Speedy and CSE studies support the contention that 
warnlng time is getting shorter? Speedy's work certainly 
i lt 
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does. The CSE study paints a more complex picture: 
warning has increased for the perceived and specific threat 
phases, but once the longer run notional threat phase IS 
included, warning time has markedly decreased over time. 
Finally, the assertion made by DONZ91 (that deployments 
since World War Two could not have been foreseen much more 
than a year beforehand) would appear to be supported by the 
evidence presented in the section on New Zealand warnIng 
time. With the exception of the Vietnam War, which gave an 
extended period of warning of three and half years, all 
other deployments gave warning times of 12 months or less. 
Indeed, the average since 1945 (including Vietnam) has been 
only 5.8 months. 
Footnotes 
1 DONZ91, op cit, P 29. 
2 Cheeseman in Ball and Langtry (1980), loc cit. 
3 See, for example, the discussion of conflict levels in 
the Australian context in Ross Babbage, A Coast Too 
Long (1990), chapter two, and in Dibb (1992), op cit, 
chapter 5. 
4 Lt Commander 1M Speedy, "The Trident of the Neptune", 
Defence Force Journal, No 8, Jan/Feb 1978, pp 7-16. 
5 
6 
AT Ross, Threat Recognition and Response (Vols I & II) 
(unclassified), Central Studies Establishment, 
Department of Defence, Canberra (1986). 
Notional threat was defined as identification of 
general hostile intent and general capability. 
Perceived threat began with the identification of 
general capability and specific threat, or general 
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hostile intent and specific capability. Finally, 
specific threat was defined as identification of 
specific hostile intent and specific capability. 
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Appendix 1 
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
Fashoda 1898 
In September 1898 the NZ Government received a sudden 
request for assistance as a confrontation developed between 
Britain and France at Fashoda. Following resort to 
peaceful negotiations between the two protagonists, no aid 
was required. 
Warning Time (WT): 0 
Boer War 1899-1902 
In mid-July 1899 it became apparent that Britain's colonies 
would be called upon to assist in the developing crlS1S 
between the Boers and Bri tish settlers. The NZ premler, 
Seddon, received approval from Parliament to offer a 
contingent on 28 September. 
WT: 2.5 months 
~If I. 
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World War I 1914-18 
Rearmament and defence reorganisation in response to the 
growlng German threat began i n 1909 with Sir Joseph Ward's 
announcement that NZ would be bu i ld ing a 'first class 
battle ship of the latest type'. In late July 1914 
predetermined war plans we r e put into e ffect. 
WT: 5 years 3 month s 
Fiji 1920 
On 28 January 1920 the NZ Government was advised of serlOUS 
unrest on Fiji, and two days 
force was ordered to the 
restoration of order. 
WT: 2 days 
Iraq 1920 
later, a small expeditionary 
islands to assist in the 
On 19 September 1920 Britain requested NZ assistance ln a 
crisis which had quickly develo p e d in Iraq. The p r lme 
minister, Massey, offered to send a Battalion, though i t 
was not finally required. 
WT: 1 day 
~j' I 
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Niue 1921 
In mid-May 1921 a vessel of the NZ Division of the Royal 
Navy, while 
assistance of 
on patrol in the Pacific, went to the 
the Niuean civil police and assisted in the 
apprehension of murder suspects. 
WT: 0 
Chanak 1922 
An outbreak of conflict between Turkey and Greece presented 
a potential threat to British interests when, on 9 
September 1922, the Turks regained Smyrna. On 16 September 
NZ received a request for assistance. Though no deployment 
occurred, planning was begun to deploy a 7000 man 
brigade-sized force. 
WT: 7 days 
Ocean Island 1925 
Following a race riot on the island on 28 December 1925, 
the NZ Government received a request for assistance. HMS 
LABURNUM and 51 men sailed to assist in the restoration of 
order. 
WT: 0 
: 1 
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Samoa 1928 
The rise of a Samoan nationalist movement led Maj Gen 
Richardson, the NZ Administrator on the island, to warn in 
early October 1928 of a "state of grave unrest". Following 
a deterioration in law and order on the island, Richardson 
requested military assistance from NZ. On 17 February, two 
ships and around 200 seamen and Royal Marines were 
despatched to assist. 
WT: 4 months 
Samoa 1929-30 
Violence erupted unexpectedly again on 28 December 1929 
when a celebration to welcome home a nationalist leader 
turned into riot in which 9 died and 18 were wounded. NZ 
once again hurriedly despatched a ship and Royal Marines. 
WT: 0 
World War II 1939-45 
Specific preparations for what became known as World War II 
began in February 1933. A British Chiefs of Staff report, 
which recommended abandonment of the ten year rule and 
spoke of the 'writing on the wall', was considered and 
accepted by the NZ Government. New Zealand declared war on 
5 September 1939. 
WT: 6 years 8 months 
~I 
I 
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Malaya 1948-60 
Towards the end of 1954, Australia, New Ze aland and British 
officials held discussions on the de f e nce of the ANZAM 
area. By December 1954 commentato r s in New Zealand were 
predicting a contribution from New Zeala nd to the defence 
of Malaya. Concern wi th the deterio r at ing s ituation ln 
Southeast Asia, amongst othe r things, led Ne w Ze aland to 
switch its wartime commitments from the Middle East to 
Southeast Asia. Following the Prime Min i s ter ' s return from 
the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference i n London, the 
new strategy was announced on 24 March 19 55. The following 
day, the deployment of a Special Ai r Se rvice Squadron to 
Ma 1 aya was announced. Tvvo RNZAF uni ts and f rig a tes were 
also eventually sent. 
WT: 5 months 
Korea 1950-53 
The invasion of South Korea by the No rth on 25 January 1950 
came as a complete strategic su r p rise to the West. NZ 
announced the despatch of two f r i gates fo u r days later and 
committed ground forces on 26 Ju l y . 
WT: 0 
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Thailand 1962 
In January 1962, with the advance of Pathet Lao troops on 
its border with Laos, the Thai Government requested NZ 
assistance. In May NZ deployed Bristols of No 31 Squadron 
and 1 SAS Troop. 
WT: 4 months 
Confrontation 1963-66 
In January 1963, Indonesia announced a policy of 
'confrontation' against the newly born Malaysian state. By 
January of the following year No 41 Squadron was carrying 
out support operations in East Malaysia as a prelude to the 
formal commitment of ground forces in September. 
WT: 12 months 
Vietnam 1964-75 
Warning for NZ commenced in early 1960 as the situation in 
South Vietnam began to seriously deteriorate. In February 
oft hat ye art he US Mil ita ry Ass i s t a nc e Comma n d Vie t n am 
(MACV) was formed. The NZ Government, which was keeping 
the si tuation under 'urgent and constant review', began to 
consider options for assistance. In June 1963 NZ announced 
its intention to make a military contribution. 
WT: 3 years 6 months 
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Falklands 1982 
On 31 March 1982 information was received of a large 
Argentinian fleet heading for the Falklands. Invasion 
followed on 2 April. NZ deployed a frigate on patrol 
duties in the Indian Ocean, freeing Royal Navy vessels for 
other tasks. 
WT: 3 days 
Fiji May 1987 
A coup d'etat in Suva on 14 May 1987 afforded no warning to 
NZ. A RNZN frigate was, by chance, in Suva at the time. 
Other ships were also despatched and anti-terrorist units 
readied. 
WT: 0 
Fiji September 1987 
A second coup by Rabuka 
unexpected. HMNZS MONOWAI 
and sailed the next day. 
WT: 0 
on 25 September was similarly 
was ordered to depart for Fiji 
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Vanuatu 1988 
Following a land rights march in Port Villa on 16 May 1988, 
rioting broke out and local security forces were stretched 
to the limi t. Vanuatu requested NZ and Australian 
assistance and materials were flown in by air. RRF 
elements were also reportedly placed on alert. 
WT: 0 
Bougainville 1989-90 
Already tense, Bougainville erupted again in January 1990 
as Bougainville Revolutionary Army Activity increased. The 
PNGDF's 'Operation Footloose' began on 11 January leading 
to an escalation in the conflict. After a number of 
foreigners were killed or injured in the fighting, the 
Australian and New Zealand governments advised their 
nationals to evacuate the island. The media reported that 
the Australian Operational Deployment Force was on standby 
to assist if required. It is highly likely that similar 
preparations were made by the New Zealand Ready Reaction 
Force based at Burnham. 
WT: 3 weeks 
Gulf War 1990 
Saddam Hussien's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a 
successful strategic surprise. On 3 December the NZ 
Government announced that it would contribute two C130 
aircraft and a medical team. 
WT: 0 
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